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Abstract
In this paper, we explore the role of labor markets for monetary policy in the euro area in a New
Keynesian model in which labor markets are characterized by search and matching frictions.
We ﬁrst investigate to which extent a more ﬂexible labor market would alter the business cycle
behavior and the transmission of monetary policy. We ﬁnd that while a lower degree of wage
rigidity makes monetary policy more eﬀective, i.e. a monetary policy shock transmits faster
onto inﬂation, the importance of other labor market rigidities for the transmission of shocks is
rather limited. Second, having estimated the model by Bayesian techniques we analyze to which
extent labor market shocks, such as disturbances in the vacancy posting process, shocks to the
separation rate and variations in bargaining power are important determinants of business cycle
ﬂuctuations. Our results point primarily towards disturbances in the bargaining process as a
signiﬁcant contributor to inﬂation and output ﬂuctuations. In sum, the paper supports current
central bank practice which appears to put considerable eﬀort into monitoring euro area wage
dynamics and which appears to treat some of the other labor market information as less impor-
tant for monetary policy.
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Euro area labor markets are characterized by a long duration of individual unemployment spells
and inﬂexible wages. The relationships between rigid labor markets and labor market out-
comes, such as, for example, unemployment durations, have received great attention in both the
academic literature and the political debate.1 In contrast, little work is available on the link
between structural features of the labor market and inﬂation, and particularly on the relevance
of these features for monetary policy. This is the more astonishing as central bank practice
puts considerable emphasis on monitoring the labor market, justiﬁed on two grounds: ﬁrst, the
structure of labor markets aﬀects the transmission of shocks to marginal costs and inﬂation, and
it aﬀects the transmission of monetary policy to the economy; second, the labor market is itself
an important source of business cycle ﬂuctuations, and thereby has a signiﬁcant impact on real
activity and inﬂation.
The contribution of this paper is to examine the role of rigid labor markets for monetary policy
in the euro area along these two dimensions. We ﬁrst analyze to what extent the business
cycle and monetary policy transmission are aﬀected by changes in the underlying institutions
governing the labor market. We speciﬁcally look at labor market structures that diﬀer from
the baseline setting with respect to the replacement rate, the bargaining power of workers, the
costs of posting vacancies and the degree of wage rigidity. For the model simulations, we employ
a genuine euro area calibration. Second, we analyze whether, given the current state of labor
market institutions, the labor market itself is an important source of business cycle shocks.
Toward this aim, we estimate the model on euro area data, investigating speciﬁcally the impact
of three labor market shocks (shocks to bargaining power, shocks to job destruction and shocks
to hiring impediments) on business cycle ﬂuctuations.
We build a New Keynesian model with a non-Walrasian labor market along the lines of Tri-
gari (2006). Calibrating this model to the euro area, we quantitatively assess how the speciﬁc
institutional aspects of the labor market aﬀect the transmission of business cycle shocks and,
most prominently, the transmission of a monetary policy shock. Rigidities and frictions in the
1 The political eﬀorts for making the EU more dynamic and competitive as established by the Lisbon Agenda
set out by the European Council in March 2000 bear witness to that debate. In light of this, assessing the
role that changes in labor markets have for monetary policy will become increasingly important as the Lisbon
Agenda is being implemented in the member states.
1labor market may aﬀect inﬂation dynamics - and hence are of relevance for the transmission of
monetary policy - in various ways. First, sluggishness in wages directly aﬀects ﬁrms’ marginal
costs and their price setting and hence ultimately feeds through to the dynamics in inﬂation,
particularly its persistence. Second, rigidities in the labor market may aﬀect the ﬂuctuations
in hours worked which may aﬀect inﬂation dynamics via their eﬀect on ﬁrm’s marginal costs
through changes in the marginal product of labor. The institutional features that we consider
in this paper will aﬀect inﬂation through one or a combination of these two channels.
We ﬁnd that a labor market characterized by a lower degree of wage rigidity signiﬁcantly changes
the transmission of shocks in our model economy. For example, monetary policy becomes
more eﬀective, i.e., a monetary policy shock transmits faster to inﬂation, and inﬂation becomes
less persistent. In contrast, altering other labor market characteristics, such as lowering ﬁrms’
overhead labor costs, reducing the net replacement rate of unemployment insurance or reducing
the costs of posting a vacancy, would have an eﬀect on the steady state of the economy but
would have little eﬀect on the ﬂuctuations around the steady state beyond the transition phase.
Estimating the same model using Bayesian techniques and allowing labor market shocks to
aﬀect the economy (in the analysis these are shocks to the costs of posting a vacancy, to the
rate of separation, and to the bargaining power of workers), we ﬁnd that shocks to the costs of
posting a vacancy and to the separation rate seem to be less important for euro area business
cycle ﬂuctuations. In contrast, shocks to the bargaining power of workers explain a considerable
share of the ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and output. Therefore, while monetary policy may not
need to react to the former shocks, closely monitoring the wage process and wage-bargaining
disturbances appears to provide valuable information for monetary stabilization policy.2
We use a New Keynesian DSGE model with Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) type search and
matching frictions. Key to our model is the channel from wages to inﬂation, which crucially
hinges on Trigari’s (2006) right-to-manage (RTM) framework. Under RTM workers and ﬁrms
bargain only about the hourly wage rate and the ﬁrm chooses employment along the intensive
(i.e., the hours worked) margin in a second step. One can show that in this case a direct channel
2 As stressed by Blanchard and Gali (2007), welfare-based conclusions regarding the optimal design of monetary
policy may depend on the interaction between real imperfections and shocks in the model. In particular, while
the actual output may not be aﬀected by labor market shocks, potential output could still change – and thus
the welfare-relevant gap. Still, reacting to (welfare-relevant) output gaps may be diﬃcult to engineer in actual
policy-making;, see, e.g., Orphanides (2001).
2from wages to inﬂation exists, so that the level of hourly wages and their stickiness play a direct
role for inﬂation dynamics; see, e.g., Trigari (2006) and Christoﬀel and Linzert (2005). Allowing
for the existence of such a wage channel is in line with much of the New Keynesian modeling
tradition, e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003).3
We complement Trigari’s (2006) right-to-manage model with Calvo type wage rigidities. These
shift the labor market adjustment from prices to quantities and aﬀect the degree of inﬂation
persistence in our model.4 Moreover, we follow Christoﬀel and Kuester (2008) and account for
ﬁxed costs associated with maintaining a job. These ﬁxed costs allow calibrating the model so
as to endogenously account for the size of unemployment ﬂuctuations over the cycle. We use
the model to assess the importance of various forms of labor market rigidities for business cycle
ﬂuctuations, and their relevance for monetary policy. Unlike Trigari, we explicitly ﬁrst calibrate
and then estimate the model using euro area data. Given the limited coverage of the euro area
in the previous literature, we devote considerable eﬀort to calibrate the model in a reasonable
way, particularly in terms of the replacement rate, the job ﬁlling rate and the separation rate.5
A growing literature incorporates more complex and more realistic labor markets into monetary
business cycle models. Walsh (2005) focuses on the real eﬀects of monetary policy shocks. Krause
and Lubik (2007) analyze the role of wage rigidities in a model with eﬃcient Nash bargaining.
Zanetti (2007) is concerned with the business cycle when the labor market itself is frictionless
but atomistic unions set the wage above the market-clearing level. Zanetti calibrates his model
to the euro area, but employment is the only labor market variable in his model. In our paper,
instead, we focus on search and matching frictions rather than unionization, which necessitates
a much wider set of labor market parameters to be calibrated for the euro area.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We present a New Keynesian model with
equilibrium unemployment in Section 2. We calibrate the model to the euro area in Section 3.
3 This direct channel would be missing when applying the eﬃcient bargaining assumption, which is the work-
horse in the literature; see Krause and Lubik (2007). Under both bargaining regimes, however, there is also
an indirect channel from wages to inﬂation via employment, hours worked and their impact on marginal costs.
4 We are not the ﬁrst to introduce staggered wage setting into models with matching frictions. Our motivation
follows Gertler and Trigari (2006), who combine staggered wage setting with Nash eﬃcient bargaining in a
real business cycle framework.
5 There are a number of estimated models for individual euro area countries that are, however, not concerned
with monetary frictions. For example, Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) and Jolivet, Postel-Vinay, and
Robin (2006) use French micro data and data from the European Community Household Panel, respectively,
to estimate search and matching models in partial equilibrium.
3Section 4 shows how diﬀerent labor market settings aﬀect the business cycle and, in particular,
monetary policy transmission. Section 5 estimates the model by Bayesian techniques, thereby
identifying labor market shocks. We subsequently analyze whether these shocks are important
determinants of business cycle ﬂuctuations of output and inﬂation. A ﬁnal section concludes.
The Appendix presents the steady state, the linearized version of the model, and background
information on the calibration of the replacement rate and the separation rate. Furthermore,
the Appendix provides information with regard to the ﬁt of the calibrated and the estimated
version of the model.
2 The Model
We build a closed-economy, single-country New Keynesian model for the euro area, which is
augmented by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) type matching frictions. Our model incorporates
the following features. First, we build on Trigari’s (2006) right-to-manage framework to allow
for a direct channel from wages to inﬂation. Second, once a ﬁrm and a worker have met, they
bargain over the hourly wage rate only infrequently, where the staggering of the wage-setting
process is modeled following Calvo (1983). And third, we follow Christoﬀel and Kuester (2008)
in accounting for job-related ﬁxed costs.
2.1 Preferences and Consumers’ Constraints









where E0 marks expectations conditional on period 0 information. u(ci,t,ct−1,hi,t) is a standard







, σ > 0, ϕ > 0. (2)
Here, ci,t denotes consumption of consumer i, ct−1 denotes aggregate consumption last period
and hi,t are hours worked by consumer i. κL is a positive scaling parameter of disutility of work
and ̺ ∈ [0,1) indicates an external habit motive.
4Consumers Live in Large Families
There is a large number of identical families in the economy with unit measure. Each family
consists of a measure of nt = 1 − ut employed members and ut unemployed members, both
with above preferences. The representative family pools the income of its working members,
unemployment beneﬁts of the unemployed members and ﬁnancial income from assets that family
members hold via a mutual fund. Its budget constraint is given by
ct + tt + κtvt =
  1−ut
0







+ Ψt + ntΦK, (3)
where ct is a choice variable of the family. tt are lump-sum taxes per capita payable by the family.
κtvt are vacancy posting costs multiplied by the number of posted vacancies. wi,thi,t is the wage
per hour times hours worked by individual household member i. b are real unemployment
beneﬁts paid to an unemployed family member. The family holds Dt units of a risk-free one-
period nominal bond (government debt) with gross nominal return Rtǫb
t in t + 1. ǫb
t denotes a
serially correlated shock to the risk premium, where
log(ǫb
t) = ρb log(ǫb
t−1) + eb




This shock drives a wedge between the return on assets held by households and the interest
rate controlled by the central bank; see Smets and Wouters (2007). The household also owns
representative shares of all ﬁrms in the economy. Ψt denotes real dividend income per member
of the family arising from these ﬁrms’ proﬁts in period t. Since our model does not explicitly
account for capital income, we assume that the family also receives a ﬁxed share ntΦK,ΦK ≥ 0,
out of current revenue of labor ﬁrms as “capital income.” Dividend income ex capital income-











i,tdi are the proﬁts arising in the diﬀerentiating industry and in the labor
good industry, respectively; these terms are described in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.










5by taking consumption, saving, vacancy posting and labor supply decisions on their behalf. The











where marginal utility of consumption is λt = (ct − ̺ct−1)
−σ.6 The optimal consumption plan











The vacancy posting and labor supply decisions are discussed in Section 2.3.
2.2 Firms
There are three sectors of production. Firms in the ﬁrst sector produce a homogeneous inter-
mediate good, labeled the “labor good.” Firms in this sector need to ﬁnd exactly one worker
in order to produce. Labor goods are sold to a wholesale sector in a perfectly competitive
market. Firms in the wholesale sector take the intermediate labor good as their sole input and
produce diﬀerentiated goods by using a constant-returns-to-scale production technology. Sub-
ject to price-setting impediments, which are modeled following Calvo (1983), they sell to a ﬁnal
retail sector under monopolistic competition.7
Retailers bundle diﬀerentiated goods into a homogeneous consumption/investment basket, yt.
They sell this ﬁnal good to consumers and to the government at price Pt.
Retail Firms
The retail sector operates in perfectly competitive factor markets. It takes wholesale goods of
6 Due to additive separability of preferences of each family member in consumption and leisure, the family
optimally allocates the same consumption stream to each member, ci,t = ct, whether employed or unemployed.
7 Following the literature (see, e.g., Trigari, 2006) we separate the markup pricing decision from the labor demand
decision. For an application that operates with temporarily ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor and a matching market in the
price-setting sector, see Kuester (2007).
6type j ∈ [0,1], labeled yj,t, and aggregates these varieties into the ﬁnal good, yt, according to
yt =








,ǫ > 1. (7)
The cost-minimizing expenditure, Pt, needed to produce one unit of the ﬁnal good is given by
Pt =







where Pj,t marks the price of good yj,t. Pt coincides with the consumer/GDP price index. The







where ǫ > 1 is the own-price elasticity of demand.
Wholesale Firms
Firms in the wholesale sector have unit mass and are indexed by j ∈ [0,1]. Firm j produces




j,t denotes its demand for the intermediate labor good, which a wholesale ﬁrm j can
acquire in a perfectly competitive market at real price xL











The ﬁrst term gives wholesale ﬁrm revenues, and the second term marks real payments for the
labor good. eC




We assume that in each period a random fraction ω ∈ [0,1) of ﬁrms cannot re-optimize their
8 There are alternative ways of introducing shocks to the Phillips curve in the literature. Other papers, Smets
and Wouters (2003), for example, model the elasticity of demand, ǫ, as time-varying. This leads to ﬂuctuations
in ﬁrms’ markups. These shocks appear in the Phillips curve exactly the way that our cost-push shocks do.
Up to a ﬁrst-order approximation, both formulations yield identical results for model dynamics. The reader
can therefore interpret the cost-push shocks as well as the “price markup shocks.”
7price. As in Smets and Wouters (2003) these ﬁrms partially index their price to last period’s
inﬂation rate, Πt−1, and partially to the steady state inﬂation rate, Π. The indexation factor is
Π
ξp
t−1Π1−ξp with the degree of indexation to past inﬂation given by ξp ∈ [0,1]. Those ﬁrms that
re-optimize their price in period t face the problem of maximizing the value of their enterprise
by choosing their sales price, Pj,t, taking into account the pricing frictions, demand function (9)
and production function (10). Realizing that for any given demand the optimal factor input
choice leads to marginal costs that are independent of the production level, the price-setting



























The term in brackets in the numerator above represents the partial indexation mechanism, with
Πt−1,t−1+s =
Pt−1+s
Pt−1 . Above, mct are real marginal costs, with mct = eC
t xL
t , and βt,t+s := βs λt+s
λt
is the equilibrium stochastic discount factor. The typical re-optimizing wholesale ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-






























t marks the optimal price set in period t. Linearizing this ﬁrst-order condition around
steady state leads to the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve with a backward-looking ele-













denotes the period proﬁts of ﬁrm j. These proﬁts accrue to the representative family, cp. equa-
tions (3) and (4).
Labor Good Firms
The labor good is homogeneous. Firms in this sector need to ﬁnd exactly one worker in order to
produce. In period t there is thus a mass of (1−ut) operative labor ﬁrms. Match i can produce
8amount li,t of the labor good using hours worked according to
li,t = zthα
i,t, α ∈ (0,1). (14)
Labor-augmenting productivity zt is identical over the diﬀerent matches and follows
log(zt) = (1 − ρz)log(z) + ρz log(zt−1) + ez





We now turn to the speciﬁcation of the labor market in our model. We ﬁrst describe the match-
ing technology and then focus on the bargaining and vacancy posting decisions.
Matching Firms and Workers
The matching process is governed by a standard Cobb-Douglas aggregate matching technology
mt = σm(ut)ξ(vt)1−ξ,ξ ∈ (0,1). (15)
Here σm > 0 is a parameter governing the matching eﬃciency, mt is the number of new matches
between workers and ﬁrms, and vt is the number of economy-wide job vacancies. We deﬁne












The probability of ﬁnding a worker when a vacancy has been opened is falling in market tightness,
and thus in the number of vacancies other ﬁrms post, showing the congestion externality of new







in turn is increasing in aggregate market tightness. Each new unemployed worker decreases the
9tightness of the labor market and therefore means a negative labor market tightness externality
to other workers searching for employment. Separations occur with an exogenous probability
ϑt ∈ (0,1) in each period. The separation rate evolves as follows
log(ϑt) = (1 − ρϑ)log(ϑ) + ρϑ log(ϑt−1) + eϑ




New matches in t, mt, become productive for the ﬁrst time in t + 1. The employment rate
nt := 1 − ut evolves according to
nt = (1 − ϑt)nt−1 + mt−1. (19)
Bargaining under Wage Rigidities
Due to the matching frictions and decreasing returns to scale at the individual labor ﬁrm level,
formed matches ex post entail economic rents. Firms and workers bargain about their share of
the overall match surplus. We follow den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) in assuming that
the family takes the labor supply decision for its workers.





















Π1−ξw   





   
+Et {βt,t+1ϑt+1Ut+1}.
(20)
The value of a worker in employment depends on his wage income, which is determined by the
product of the nominal wage rate, Wi,t, and the hours worked, hi,t. The ﬁnal term in the ﬁrst
row pertains to the utility loss from working. In the next period, an employed worker retains
his job with probability 1 − ϑt+1. If he stays employed in t + 1, with probability γ he will not
be able to re-bargain the nominal wage. In case the worker cannot renegotiate his wage, the







, ξw ∈ [0,1], as in Smets and









Π1−ξw   
. Or he is
able to re-bargain, in which case his value reﬂects the optimal re-bargained wage rate in t + 1:
V E
t+1(W∗
t+1). With probability ϑt+1 he will be unemployed next period. The value to the family
10of having a worker who is unemployed is given by













Π1−ξw   





   
+Et {βt,t+1(1 − st)Ut+1}.
(21)
Here b is the value of real unemployment beneﬁts. A worker who is unemployed in t has a
chance of st of ﬁnding a new job that is productive from t+1 onward. This newly hired worker
enters the same Calvo scheme as the average currently employed worker. With probability
(1 − γ) the family can bargain the wage in t + 1 on his behalf, with probability γ he will start








. This implies stickiness of hourly wage rates also for new matches.
The rationale is that actual ﬁrms in the economy have many jobs, i.e., ﬁrm-worker matches.
These jobs may be ﬁlled at diﬀerent moments of time, while the ﬁrm itself adjusts its entire
wage structure only infrequently. As a result, the individual worker who joins a ﬁrm between
two adjustment points receives the prevailing wage rate at that multi-worker ﬁrm. A similar
assumption is made by Gertler and Trigari (2006).9
Let ∆t(Wi,t) := V E
t (Wi,t)−Ut denote the family’s surplus from having a worker in employment
at wage Wi,t rather than having him unemployed. One can show that
∆t(Wi,t) =
Wi,t
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Due to free entry in the vacancy posting market, in equilibrium ﬁrms are economically worthless
when they are separated from a worker. The market value, Jt(Wi,t), of a labor ﬁrm matched to
9 Christoﬀel and Kuester (2008) show that the existence of a wage channel under RTM does not depend on
sticky entry wages. Similarly, the existence of sticky entry wages is not crucial for unemployment ﬂuctuations
when RTM bargaining is used; see Christoﬀel et al. (2008). The latter is in contrast to EB.
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hi,t − Φ (24)
denotes real per-period proﬁts of the ﬁrm when the nominal wage rate is Wi,t. hi,t is the ﬁrm’s
labor input. xL
t is the competitive price for the labor good in real terms, Φ ≥ 0 denotes a per-
period ﬁxed cost of production. For calibration purposes, this ﬁxed cost is split into a putative
cost of capital, which accrues to the owners of the ﬁrm, ΦK ≥ 0, and a ﬁxed overhead cost of
production, which is pure waste, ΦL ≥ 0, so Φ = ΦK + ΦL.10
With right-to-manage wage bargaining, facing a certain hourly wage rate ﬁrms decide unilater-
ally about their demand for hours worked. Each labor ﬁrm i optimally demands labor at the
intensive margin until the marginal value product of every labor ﬁrm i, xL
t mpli,t, equals the real





, where mpli,t := ztαhα−1
i,t . (25)
For those ﬁrms that bargain in a given period, nominal wages are determined by means of Nash







where ηt ∈ (0,1) denotes the possibly time-varying bargaining power of the workers or, respec-
10 Job-related ﬁxed costs are costs that are independent of the actual hours worked per employee (but not of
the number of employees). In our model they make a ﬁrm’s surplus (and thus its hiring incentives) more
responsive to economic shocks. In practice such job-related ﬁxed costs arise both on the labor and the capital
side. On the labor side most prominently some employer beneﬁts are not linked to the actual input of hours
worked (and current earnings). An example of this is a ﬁxed entitlement of paid leave per quarter. As Table
2 shows, in our calibration this share is reasonably small, less than a percent of output. On the capital side,
too, and even more so some expenditure seems relatively inelastic to the actual hours worked per employee,
a prime example being rental costs for oﬃce space, or other longer-term ﬁnancial liabilities. This cost, Φ
K,
consequently is larger in our calibration.
12tively, of their families:
log(ηt) = (1 − ρη)log(η) + ρη log(ηt−1) + e
η





The optimization in (26) takes into account that each ﬁrm sets hours worked optimally according
to (25) in each period.11
Vacancy Posting
Free entry into the vacancy posting market drives the ex ante value of a vacancy to zero. In
equilibrium, real vacancy posting costs, κt, equal the expected value of a labor ﬁrm properly














   




The term in square brackets reﬂects our assumption that newly started jobs face the same Calvo
rigidities as incumbent jobs. This is motivated by the existence of wage structures in multi-
worker ﬁrms (these ﬁrms being the collection of many jobs) that are adjusted only infrequently.
With probability (1−γ) the ﬁrm-worker pair can reset its wage. With the remaining probability,
the wage is set to the average wage rate that prevailed in the previous period. κt evolves
according to
log(κt) = (1 − ρκ)log(κ) + ρκ log(κt−1) + eκ




2.4 Monetary Policy and Fiscal Policy
The monetary authority controls the risk-free wholesale interest rate on nominal bonds, Rt. The
empirical literature (see, e.g., Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 1998, Smets and Wouters, 2005) ﬁnds








t . Here δ
W
t is the
marginal gain in surplus of the worker when increasing the wage rate, δ
F
t the marginal loss of the ﬁrm. The




t are complicated and add little to the economic intuition. See Appendix
A.2 for linearized versions. See Trigari (2006) for the wage equation under RTM in the absence of wage
stickiness.
13that simple generalized Taylor-type rules of the form
































once linearized are a good representation of monetary policy in recent decades in a number of
countries. Here Π is the inﬂation target, and yt
ﬂex is the ﬂexible price/ﬂexible wage output level
in the economy. This is the hypothetical level of output in the absence of nominal rigidities








is a shock to
monetary policy.
Government spending, gt, is exogenous and follows
log(gt) = (1 − ρg)g + ρg log(gt−1) + e
g
















t−1 + gt. (29)
The government generates revenue from lump-sum taxes, tt. It also earns income through new
debt issues, Dt
Pt (left-hand side). The last term on the left-hand side clariﬁes the nature of our
modeling of the cost-push shock, eC
t . The shock is modeled as a lump-sum tax so that it does
not enter the economy’s resource constraint. Up to ﬁrst-order, this modeling delivers the same
results as when shocks to the price markup existed; cf., for example, Smets and Wouters (2003).
On the expenditure-side appear unemployment beneﬁts (the term involving b), debt repayment
and coupon as well as government spending. We assume that ﬁscal policy is debt-stabilizing.
2.5 Market Clearing
Retail output is used for private and government consumption and for vacancy posting activity
and the ﬁxed overhead costs of producing labor goods. Total demand is thus given by
yd
t = ct + gt + κtvt + ntΦL. (30)
Market clearing in the retail market requires that the demand for retail goods equal total supply,











. For each ﬁrm j in the wholesale sector, its supply
yj,t = ld






yt in order to clear






j,t marks demand for the labor good by individual wholesale ﬁrm j. Market clearing requires






3 Euro Area Data and a Calibrated Version of the Model
We calibrate the model to the euro area as of the end of 2006.12 For individual euro area
countries it is well documented that aggregate macroeconomic time series have become less
volatile starting from the 1980s; see Stock and Watson (2005). Hence, we employ only quarterly
data from 1984Q1 to 2006Q4 for the calibration. All euro area-wide data are taken from the
Area-Wide-Model database.13
The AWM data set does not include two of the central labor market series for estimating the
model: hours worked per employee and vacancies, both of which are not readily available for
the euro area. Instead we resort to proxies. First, we entertain a euro area proxy, in which a
quarterly series for total hours worked is obtained from the annual euro area ﬁgures from the EU
KLEMS database interpolated with euro area GDP. An index of vacancies is constructed based
on individual euro area country vacancy data following ECB (2002), covering around 60% of the
euro area.14 Second, as an alternative, we use German data to proxy for euro area vacancies
and hours, thus assuming implicitly that business cycles in the euro area and Germany are fully
synchronized. The vacancy series corresponds to “Oﬀene Stellen” from the German Federal
12 The euro area at that point comprised Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
13 We use the unemployment rate and the 3-month short-term nominal interest rate. Output is measured by
nominal GDP divided by the GDP deﬂator. Similarly, government spending is deﬂated by the GDP deﬂator.
Inﬂation is measured by year-on-year GDP inﬂation. Total real wages are computed by dividing compensation
to employees by the GDP deﬂator. The real wage per employee is obtained by dividing this series by the number
of employees.
14 ECB (2002) describes the data available for measuring vacancies in the euro area. We use OECD data for
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, Luxembourg, and Portugal and BIS data for the Netherlands,
from which we construct a population-weighted euro area vacancy measure. Vacancy data correspond to
vacancies posted at public employment agencies and do not take into account other sources of oﬀers, such as
newspapers, the Internet and private agencies.
15Employment Agency. The German series for quarterly hours worked is taken from the ESA
quarterly national accounts.
Second Moments of the Data: Euro Area vs. U.S.
Table 1: Second moments of the data - euro area vs. U.S. (1984Q1-2006Q4)
std(x) std(x)/std(y) corr(x,y) ARx(1)
Variable EA US EA US EA US EA US
  yt .85 (1.19) 1.00 (1.00) 1.00 (1.00) .87 (.87)
  Rt .21 ( .28) .24 ( .24) .65 ( .60) .88 (.92)
  Π
yoy
t .50 ( .39) .59 ( .33) .43 ( .21) .82 (.85)
  wt +   ht +   nt 1.13 (1.47) 1.32 (1.24) .77 ( .79) .93 (.90)
  wt +   ht .57 (1.05) .67 ( .89) .36 ( .61) .77 (.84)
  ut 4.59 (8.26) 5.36 (6.97) -.85 (-.85) .96 (.94)
Euro area proxies for total hours worked and vacancies
  ht +   nt .73 (1.41) .85 (1.19) .76 ( .85) .96 (.94)
  wt .54 (1.03) .64 ( .87) .56 (-.03) .75 (.81)
  vt 12.23 (9.91) 14.28 (8.36) .71 ( .85) .96 (.91)
German proxies four total hours worked and vacancies
  ht +   nt .77 (1.41) .90 (1.19) .81 ( .85) .77 (.94)
  wt .77 (1.03) .90 ( .87) .31 (-.03) .74 (.81)
  vt 13.79 (9.91) 16.10 (8.36) .63 ( .85) .92 (.91)
Notes: The table reports summary statistics of second moments of euro area data and U.S. data (in
brackets). The log data are hp(1,600) ﬁltered and multiplied by 100 thereafter in order to obtain
percentage ﬂuctuations. The sample is 1984Q1 to 2006Q4. From top to bottom: output,   yt, nominal
interest rate,   Rt, year-on-year inﬂation,   Π
yoy
t , total wages,   wt+  ht+  nt, real wage per employee,   wt+  ht,
unemployment,   ut, total hours worked,   ht+  nt, real hourly wage rate,   wt, and vacancies,   vt. The second
and third columns report the standard deviation of the series and its standard deviation relative to
that of output. The fourth column shows the contemporaneous cross-correlation with output. The ﬁnal
column reports ﬁrst-order serial correlation coeﬃcients.
Table 1 presents the second moments of the data. All data are in logs, hp(1,600) ﬁltered and
multiplied by 100 thereafter in order to obtain percentage ﬂuctuations. The ﬁrst column gives
the notation of the variable in our model. The second column shows the standard deviation of
the series and the third column displays the standard deviation of the respective series relative
to that of output. The ﬁnal two columns report the contemporaneous correlation with output
and the serial correlation of the respective series.
For comparison, Table 1 also reports the corresponding measures for U.S. data (in brackets).15
15 U.S. data are from the St. Louis Fed database FRED II. Real quantities are derived from nominal quantities
by dividing by the GDP deﬂator. U.S. output is output in the business sector. Total hours worked are hours
worked in the business sector. Real hourly wages are measured by the real compensation per hour in the
16While steady states in the two economies diﬀer considerably,16 business cycle ﬂuctuations for the
reported macro-economic time series look by and large remarkably similar in the U.S. and the
euro area. The most notable diﬀerence perhaps is that real hourly wages are more procyclical
in the euro area than in the U.S., and that vacancies appear to be more volatile in the euro
area. The otherwise great similarity in terms of co-movement extends the evidence in Smets
and Wouters (2005) to labor market variables.
Euro Area Calibration
The calibration of the model for the euro area is summarized in Table 2. The time-discount
factor, β, is chosen to match an average annual real rate of 3.3%. The value of the curvature
of disutility of work, ϕ = 2, follows the estimates of Smets and Wouters (2003).17 The value
of the risk aversion coeﬃcient is set to σ = 1.5 and habit persistence, ̺ = 0.6, in line with the
estimates by Smets and Wouters (2003). κL targets hours per worker, h = 1/3.
Turning to the labor good sector and the labor markets, we set parameter α to the conventional
value of α = 0.66, targeting a labor share of 60%. On monthly data ranging to the early 1990s,
Burda and Wyplosz (1994) estimate an elasticity of matches with respect to unemployment of
ξ = 0.7 for France, Germany and Spain. Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) survey estimates
of the matching function for European countries and for the U.S. and conclude that a range
from ξ = 0.5 to ξ = 0.7 is most reasonable.18 We select the midpoint, setting ξ = 0.6. We set
the quarterly job separation rate, ϑ, to 3% following the evidence for the euro area collected
in Appendix B.2. This squares well with indirect evidence for OECD countries presented by
Hobijn and Sahin (2007). The bargaining power of the worker is set to a conventional value of
business sector. Vacancies are measured by the Conference Board’s index of Help-Wanted Advertising. The
table uses the civilian unemployment rate (16 years old and older). The inﬂation rate is (year-on-year) GDP
inﬂation. The interest rate is the quarterly average of the fed funds rate.
16 Mean unemployment rates in the U.S. are considerably lower than in the euro area. In line with this, Table 8
(in Appendix B.1) documents that the two economies show pronounced diﬀerences with respect to replacement
rates and durations of unemployment. Complementary, Appendix B.2 illustrates that the two economies diﬀer
with respect to job and worker ﬂows, too.
17 The elasticity of inter-temporal substitution of labor, 1/ϕ, is small in most microeconomic studies (between 0
and 0.5) for the euro area; for details, see Evers, Mooij, and Vuuren (2005), who report statistics based on a
meta sample as well as estimates based on Dutch data.
18 The estimates Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) summarize show more variability than suggested by this range,
and several papers estimate a lower value of ξ. Our calibration is in line though with more recent evidence for
Germany based on data for diﬀerent industries and educational groups; see Fahr and Sunde (2004).
17Table 2: Parameters and their calibrated values
Parameter Value Explanation; Target/Reference
Preferences
β .992 Time-discount factor; matches annual real rate of 3.3 percent.
ϕ 2 Labor supply elasticity of 0.5; close to mode in Smets and Wouters (2003).
σ 1.5 Risk aversion; mode of estimates in Smets and Wouters (2003)
̺ .6 External habit persistence; mode of estimates in Smets and Wouters (2003).
κL 94.7 Scaling factor to disutility of work; targets h = 1/3.
Bargaining and Labor Good
α .66 Labor elasticity of production; targets labor share of 60%.
ξ .6 Elasticity of matches w.r.t. unemployment; Burda and Wyplosz (1994).
γ .83 Avg. duration of wages contracts of 6 qtrs.; see e.g. Mermet (2001).
ϑ .03 Quarterly separation rate; Hobijn and Sahin (2007) and Appendix B.2.
η .5 Bargaining power of workers; conventional value.
σm .42 Eﬃciency of matching; reconciles m with target u = 0.09 and q = 0.7.
κ .058 Vacancy posting costs; reconciles m with target for u and q.
z 2.27 Technology; targets output y = 1.
ΦK .33 Imputed share of capital in revenue; capital income ratio.
ΦL .0069 Fixed cost associated with labor; targets std(  ut)/std(  yt) in the data.
ξw 0 Wage indexation; no indexation in baseline model.
Wholesale Sector
ǫ 11 Markup; conventional price-markup of 10%.
ω .75 Calvo stickiness of prices; avg. duration of 4 qrts; ´ Alvarez et al. (2006).
ξp 0 Price indexation; no indexation in baseline model.
Government
γπ 1.5 Response to inﬂation; conventional Taylor rule.
γy .5 Response to output gap; conventional Taylor rule.
γ∆y 0 Response to output growth; conventional Taylor rule.
γR .85 Interest rate smoothing coeﬃcient; conventional value.
g .2 Government spending; targets government spending-GDP ratio.
b .429 Unemploym. beneﬁts; targets replacement rate b
wh = 0.65, see Appendix B.1.
Correlation of Shocks and Size of Innovations
ρg .79 Autocorrelation of government spending; estimated, see text.
ρz .64 Autocorrelation of technology shock; estimated, see text
(identiﬁed using the model’s resource constraint).
ρb .85 Autocorrelation of premium shock; persistent demand shock.
σmoney .1 Standard deviation of monetary policy shock; estimated, see text.
σg .47 Standard deviation of innovation to government spending; estimated, see text.
σz .39 Standard deviation of innovation to technology; estimated, see text.
σb .19 Standard deviation of innovation to premium shock; targets std(  yt).
Notes: The table reports calibrated parameter values. The model’s implications, the level of inﬂation apart, are
independent of the target level of inﬂation. Without loss of generality, we set Π = 1. The model is calibrated to
euro area data from 1984Q1 to 2006Q4. See the main text for details.
18η = 0.5.19 We target a probability of ﬁnding a worker when having opened a vacancy of q = 0.7,
in line with the evidence reported in ECB (2002) and Weber (2000).20 We further target an
unemployment rate in steady state of u = 9.1%, which is the average unemployment rate in our
sample. In order to match these two targets, the eﬃciency of the matching process is set to
σm = 0.42, and vacancy posting costs are set to κ = 0.058. The level of technology z = 2.27
ensures that output, y, equals unity in steady state. We assume that 1/3 of a ﬁrm’s revenue
ﬂows to “capital,” ΦK = 1/3.21 We calibrate the period ﬁxed cost associated with overhead
labor costs to 0.69% of revenue, which means ΦL = 0.0069. In choosing this number, we seek
to replicate the degree of ﬂuctuations in unemployment that the model implies. We set real
unemployment beneﬁts, b, by targeting a replacement rate of b
wh = 0.65 in steady state, which
Appendix B.1 argues is a reasonable choice.
In the wholesale sector, we calibrate the markup to a conventional value of 10% implying an
elasticity of demand of ǫ = 11. For the average contract duration of prices we use the results
of the Eurosystem Inﬂation Persistence Network and set the corresponding Calvo parameter to
ω = 0.75, which amounts to an average price duration of 4 quarters, see Alvarez et al. (2006).22
Mermet (2001) reports that wages in euro area countries are typically renegotiated every 1 to 2
years. Following this we set the degree of nominal wage rigidity to γ = 0.83, which implies an
average wage duration of 6 quarters.23
19 Since we neglect search on-the-job, our bargaining power parameter captures both genuine bargaining power
of the worker absent an outside oﬀer and indirect bargaining power of the worker supported by an outside
oﬀer, which lifts the outside option in the bargaining process above the value of unemployment. Cahuc et
al. (2006) report estimates of the genuine bargaining power of workers when workers can search on-the-job.
Their estimates based on French matched employer-employee data are lower than the value of η reported here.
However, they also report a substantial share of indirect bargaining power coming from search on-the job. We
thus deem our value of η = 0.5 defendable. In any case, our results appear to be robust to that choice.
20 ECB (2002) reports the proportion of hard-to-ﬁll vacancies, i.e., vacancies that have a duration of six months
and longer for some euro area countries. This proportion is roughly 10%, squaring with the probability of
ﬁnding a worker within a quarter’s time of q = 70%. Moreover, Weber (2000), using Dutch data, reports that
after 4 months, 74% of the vacancies in her sample were ﬁlled.
21 It is understood that with capital being endogenous and mobile, a capital share of 1/3 would not necessarily be
counted as a ﬁxed cost. The size of job-related ﬁxed costs matters for the size of the unemployment ﬂuctuations
in the model. If unemployment ﬂuctuations are to be large enough, in the absence of labor market shocks the
ﬁxed costs must make up a large enough share of a ﬁrm’s revenue once variable costs have been deducted. Yet
an extended model with RTM bargaining, which would allow for endogenous capital accumulation, could also
be calibrated to match the unemployment ﬂuctuations.
22 According to the evidence collected by the IPN reported in ´ Alvarez et al. (2006), the average price duration
in the euro area based on data for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain is 13 months.
23 This is also in line with more recent evidence collected by the Eurosystem Wage Dynamics Network. This
19We set the share of government spending in GDP to 20%, which corresponds to the average
government consumption to GDP ratio from 1984Q1 to 2006Q4. Monetary policy follows a
standard Taylor rule with a long-run response to inﬂation of γπ = 1.5, with a long-run response
to the output gap of γy = 0.5, and no response to output growth γ∆y = 0. The rule is augmented
by interest rate smoothing, with the coeﬃcient on the lagged interest rate being set to γR = 0.85.
These values are roughly in line with Smets and Wouters (2003).
We parameterize four shock processes: the technology shock, zt, the government spending shock,
gt, the monetary policy shock, e
money
t , and the risk-premium shock, ǫb
t. That is, the calibrated
version of the model abstracts from labor market shocks as well as cost-push shocks. The ﬁrst
three of the above shocks are directly observable or identiﬁed by our model given our previous
assumptions. The technology shock follows from the model’s aggregate production function
  zt =   yt −
 
α  ht +   nt
 
.
A hat denotes the HP(1,600) ﬁltered cyclical component of the corresponding series in logs.
We model the technology shock as an AR(1) process, the parameters of which are obtained by
estimating   zt = ρz  zt−1 +ez
t by ordinary least squares. Also government spending is represented
by an AR(1) process estimated on the HP(1,600) ﬁltered government consumption data for the
sample period. The shock to monetary policy can be inferred by inverting the Taylor rule24
  e
money
t =   Rt −
 









  yt −   yﬂex
t
  
+ γ∆y (  yt −   yt−1)
 
.
We then compute the standard deviation of the shock series   e
money
t , which gives our calibration
for σmoney. Finally, we model the risk-premium shock as an AR(1) process. The autocorrelation
is set to ρb = 0.85. The standard deviation of the risk-premium shock is set such that the output
series in our model matches the ﬂuctuations of output in the data.
Steady State of the Calibrated Model
Table 3 reports the resulting steady state. Output was normalized to unity, allowing us to inter-
reports average wage contract durations for various euro area countries between one and three years; see du
Caju et al. (2008)..
24 We proxy for the output gap by using the deviation of actual output from trend.




whn/y .6 Labor share in total output.
u .091 Unemployment rate.
v .039 Vacancies.
s .3 Probability of ﬁnding a job within a quarter.
q .7 Probability of ﬁnding a worker within a quarter.
b/(wh) .65 Unemployment insurance replacement rate.
κv/y .0023 Share of output lost to vacancy posting.
ΦK/(xLzhα) .33 Share of a labor ﬁrm’s revenue paid to capital.
ΦL/(xLzhα) .0069 Share of a labor ﬁrm’s output lost to ﬁxed costs.
ΨC/y .091 Proﬁt share (Calvo sector) in total output.
ΨLn/y .0029 Proﬁt share (labor sector) in total output.
J .084 Value of a labor ﬁrm.
∆ .07 Surplus of the worker from working.
Notes: Steady state implied by the calibration summarized in Table 2.
pret GDP components as shares of GDP. Consumption is 79% of GDP owing to our calibration
of the government sector to 20% of GDP and the absence of investment and foreign trade. The
remainder of output falls on vacancy costs and overhead labor costs. The labor share in output
is nwh
nzhα = w
zhα−1 = xLα = 60%, in line with the recent ﬁgures for euro area countries reported
by Lawless and Whelan (2007) and Eurostat’s measure of the adjusted wage share.25
The steady state unemployment rate was targeted to be 9.1%, in line with the average of the
euro area unemployment rate over the sample period. The calibration implies a probability of
ﬁnding a job within a quarter’s time, s, of around 30%, which is in line with the high incidence
of long-term unemployment in the euro area; see also Table 8 in Appendix B.1. Roughly 0.23%
of output is lost to vacancy posting costs each quarter. The steady state value of a worker to
a ﬁrm is J = 0.084, meaning 8.4% of a quarter’s value of its revenue, and the surplus to the
family of having a worker employed is ∆ = 0.070, or 10.6% of a quarter’s wage.
Second Moments in the Calibrated Model
25 Eurostat reports the adjusted wage share as the ratio of the compensation of employees and nominal GDP.
This averages to around 60% over the period from 1984 to 2004. These numbers do not include imputed wage
income of entrepreneurs. With the AWM data set used in this paper, the labor share averages to 56%.
21Table 4: Second Moments of the model compared to euro area data
Variable std to std(y) corr with y AR(1)
model data model data model data
  yt 1.00 [ 1.00] 1.00 [ 1.00] .93 [ .87]
  Rt .21 [ .24] -.06 [ .65] .84 [ .88]
  Π
yoy
t .37 [ .59] .68 [ .43] .89 [ .82]
  wt +   ht +   nt 1.37 [ 1.32] .85 [ .77] .80 [ .93]
  wt +   ht 1.00 [ .67] .67 [ .36] .63 [ .77]
  ut 5.36 [ 5.36] -.91 [ -.85] .94 [ .96]
Euro area proxies for total hours worked and vacancies
  ht +   nt 1.45 [ .85] .80 [ .76] .80 [ .96]
  ht 1.10 [ .52] .60 [ .39] .66 [ .91]
  wt .24 [ .64] .04 [ .56] .93 [ .75]
  vt 15.94 [14.28] .75 [ .71] .63 [ .95]
Notes: The table reports summary statistics of the calibrated model and compares those
to the data (values in brackets). The model was calibrated so as to replicate the stan-
dard deviation of output and unemployment in the data. The ﬁrst column reports the
standard deviation of the respective series relative to the standard deviation of output.
The second column shows the cross-correlation with output. The ﬁnal column reports
the serial correlation of the respective series. All model moments are unconditional
moments. The computations for the data were performed on the sample 1984Q1 to
2006Q4.
Table 4 shows the implied second moments in the calibrated model along with the serial cor-
relation coeﬃcients. For comparison, the moments in the (euro area) data are given in square
brackets. The model captures both the standard deviations and the co-movement in the data
fairly well. Due to the decreasing returns to scale in the production function, hours worked being
the only factor of production and due to the calibrated series of shocks not being very persistent,
the total hours worked are too volatile relative to the data and similarly is the compensation
per employee.26 Most important, however, the model reproduces the substantial ﬂuctuations in
unemployment and vacancies over the business cycle that are present in the euro area data. See
Appendix C for further evidence on the ﬁt of the calibrated model in dimensions that were not
targeted. Refer to Appendix D for comparisons of the calibrated model and the version of the
model that we estimate in Section 5.
26 As a point of reference, Trigari (2006) analyzes the use of the intensive (hours worked) and the extensive
(employment) margin and the forces that drive the use of these margins in a model with eﬃcient bargaining.
Much of her analysis carries over to our model, the exception being that the replacement rate, b/(wh), does
not have a strong bearing on the relative use of the two margins with RTM.
224 The Role of Labor Market Rigidities for Monetary Policy
In this section, we use the calibrated version of the model for counterfactual analysis. We ﬁrst
compare the transmission of monetary policy in this calibrated baseline that is characterized
by rather rigid labor markets, labeled case a), to the transmission if the euro area were char-
acterized by more ﬂexible labor markets. Thereafter, we assess the eﬀect on the business cycle
more generally. As in the ongoing policy discussion, the term “ﬂexible labor markets” here is
encompassing: We look at proxies that capture many of the diﬀerent dimensions in which labor
market institutions and labor laws in the euro area could be reformed.
In particular, these more ﬂexible labor markets are characterized by b) a lower degree of nominal
wage rigidity (read: more frequent wage negotiations or, more generally, a more ﬂexible ﬁrm-
worker bargaining), or by c) lower hiring costs/lower costs of posting vacancies, which capture
impediments to hiring as well as – to a certain extent – lay-oﬀ costs.27 We further examine
the behavior of the economy when d) unemployment beneﬁts are lower, which would make
labor supply more responsive to economic conditions, and when e) the bargaining power of
workers is below the status quo. This is a proxy for lower union bargaining power or for less
“worker-friendly” labor legislation. In addition, we look at the economy when f) there are fewer
job-related ﬁxed costs, so that average labor costs are more responsive to actual hours worked
(or more broadly interpreted: to economic conditions and eﬀort).
Before describing the impact of these counterfactuals quantitatively, we give a brief overview of
what drives marginal costs in the model, and thus inﬂation dynamics. This helps to gauge how
the labor market-related rigidities and the speciﬁc modeling aﬀect the marginal costs.
i) The Wage Channel and the Intensive Margin
Under right-to-manage, there is a direct channel from the hourly wage rate to the marginal costs
of price-setting ﬁrms and thus to inﬂation; see Trigari (2006) and Christoﬀel and Linzert (2005).
In the model, marginal costs of price-setting ﬁrms – once linearized around steady state – are
27 Since separations are exogenous in our model, costs of hiring and costs of separation have the same economic
eﬀects. This would cease to be the case once the separation margin was endogenized.
23given by
  mct =   eC
t +   xL
t =   eC
t +   wt −   mplt
=   eC
t +   wt + (1 − α)  ht, α ∈ (0,1).
(31)
Hats denote percent deviations from steady state. As apparent from Equation (31), factors
aﬀecting the wage dynamics, such as shocks to the bargaining power of workers, the outside
option of the worker or changes in market tightness, or factors aﬀecting the degree of wage
stickiness, will have a direct eﬀect on marginal costs.28 Therefore wages directly feed into
the dynamics of inﬂation via the Phillips curve. This diﬀerentiates a setup with RTM from
models with eﬃcient wage bargaining (EB). In the latter, in equilibrium, wages also matter for
inﬂation dynamics, yet this eﬀect is less direct, and works only via the eﬀect of wages on hiring
incentives on the extensive margin. In particular, wage stickiness in existing matches alone
does not have any eﬀect on inﬂation dynamics with eﬃcient bargaining (all that matters is the
stickiness of wages of prospective new hires), while it does aﬀect inﬂation dynamics under RTM;
see Christoﬀel et al. (2008) for an extensive discussion. Under EB more rigid wage rates do not
directly induce a smoother response of inﬂation to a monetary shock.29 Allowing the ﬁrm to
choose hours worked on the intensive margin for a given wage rate is crucial for the existence
of the direct wage channel. We view this assumption as particularly realistic for the euro area,
where restrictions on the hiring and separation margin might make ﬁrms more likely to cover
temporary ﬂuctuations in demand by means of an adjustment in hours worked per employee.
As shown in Equation (31), in addition to the direct eﬀect of wages on inﬂation there is an-
other eﬀect via the marginal product of labor, which would also be present in the eﬃcient
28 The wage equation in the absence of wage stickiness (γ = 0) helps to build intuition. Up to a ﬁrst-order
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. mrst marks the family’s marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and leisure. Though the details diﬀer from wage equations with eﬃcient bargaining (Trigari, 2006,
provides a comparison), wages are driven by the same forces. Wages are the higher the larger the marginal
revenue product of labor and the lower ﬁxed costs are, the higher beneﬁts and the higher the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure, and the tighter the labor market.
29 In the presence of an intensive margin, marginal costs are given by the marginal cost of an hour worked. With




mplt , where the marginal rate of substitution
of the worker between leisure and consumption, mrst, replaces the wage rate. In Krause and Lubik (2007),
the contemporaneous employment adjustment margin instead is to lay oﬀ fewer workers. Marginal costs are
therefore more complicated and include the behavior of the (shadow) cost of posting a vacancy.
24bargaining environment. In both approaches the relative use of the extensive margin (number
of employees) vs. the intensive margin (hours per worker) aﬀects inﬂation dynamics. The more
of an increase in labor input falls on the intensive margin, the more does the marginal prod-
uct of labor,   mplt = (α − 1)  ht, fall, and the more does the price of the labor good rise, and
thus the more do marginal costs for price-setting ﬁrms increase. The wage, too, is aﬀected by
changes in the composition of total hours worked in the intensive and the extensive margin, both
through changes in the marginal product of labor and the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure and through changes in market tightness; cf. Footnote 28. Many of
the counterfactuals that we discuss have implications for the relative use of the extensive margin.
ii) The Role of Job-Related Fixed Costs for Unemployment and Inﬂation
For the relative use of the two margins, the ﬁxed costs are essential. Under RTM, in equilibrium
employees receive a constant share α of a ﬁrm’s revenue, xL
t zthα
i,t. Absent ﬁxed costs, Φ, the
same would hold true for proﬁts. However, combining period proﬁts of a labor ﬁrm (24) and







hi,t − Φ. (32)




Pt hi,t. For any given ﬂuctuation in wages higher ﬁxed costs mean that
proﬁts ﬂuctuate by more (in percentage terms), which can be seen from the linearized version
of (32):   ΨL




α wh−Φ ≥ 1. The increased ﬂuctuation of proﬁts in
percentage terms in turn translates into more co-variation of the hiring behavior of ﬁrms with
the business cycle; see Christoﬀel and Kuester (2008). For this reason, the size of the ﬁxed costs
in the labor good sector also has a bearing on the response of inﬂation to shocks. The higher
the ﬁxed costs for given calibration targets in the labor market, the more of any adjustment in
labor input falls on the extensive (hiring) margin of employment and the less is the marginal
product of labor aﬀected.30
30 Related to the former, Hall (2005) and Shimer (2004) demonstrate that under eﬃcient wage bargaining, the
smoother the wage is, the more will percentage proﬁts ﬂuctuate. As a result, under EB the smoother the wage
is, the greater will be the ﬂuctuations in hiring activity. Under RTM in contrast, in equilibrium the revenue of
labor ﬁrms ﬂuctuates (in percentage terms) as much as wages per employee. Absent ﬁxed costs, proﬁts would
also ﬂuctuate (in percentage terms) as much as wages per employee.
254.1 Monetary Transmission in Rigid and More Flexible Labor Markets
In the ﬁgures that follow we analyze how an unanticipated monetary policy shock works its way
to output and inﬂation in each scenario. The baseline response is always shown as a black solid
line. The interest rate is denoted in quarterly terms and is not annualized, similarly for inﬂation.
a) Rigid Labor Markets - the Baseline Response
A lower interest rate in the presence of nominal rigidities induces a lower real interest rate, which
leads households to increase consumption. Output reacts accordingly; cp. Figure 1. Increased
Figure 1: Impulse responses to 25bps monetary policy shock: nominal wage rigidity
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Notes: The panels show percentage responses (1 in the plots corresponds to 1%) to a
1
4% monetary policy
easing for varying degrees of nominal wage rigidity. The black solid line marks the calibrated model. For
this, the average real wage rate falls mildly below steady state, which is hard to see due to the scaling of the
charts (lower right panel). The blue dashed line corresponds to an intermediate degree of wage rigidity
(γ = 0.5). The red dotted line marked by circles shows the case of no wage rigidity (γ = 0). An increase
in unemployment of 1 means that the unemployment rate increases by 1% above steady state, say ,from 9.1%
to 9.19%, not by one percentage point.
production in turn requires additional labor input. Due to the one-period lag between matching
and employment, the number of employed workers cannot increase instantly. Hence labor adjust-
ment is initially fully implemented by an increase of hours worked per employee (the intensive
margin),   ht. But the rise in demand also stimulates expected proﬁts in the labor sector. This
26leads to more vacancy posting activity. As a consequence, there is more hiring (the extensive
margin), so unemployment falls. In anticipation of a tighter labor market and higher proﬁts,
the value of an existing match increases and workers who renegotiate their contracts aspire to
gain higher wages.31 In the baseline, the changes in wages and the marginal product of labor
taken together imply a rise in inﬂation following a monetary easing (see the black solid line in
Figure 1).32
b) Lower Degree of Nominal Wage Rigidity
The blue dashed line in Figure 1 shows the response of the economy to a monetary easing when
wages are negotiated on average twice a year (γ = 0.5) instead of only every six quarters. The
case of fully ﬂexible wages (γ = 0) is shown as a red dotted line marked by circles. All other
parameters remain at the values in the baseline. Real wage rates rise more profoundly when
nominal wages are more ﬂexible, which implies a steeper increase in marginal costs. In turn,
this causes the initial inﬂation response to be greater, and the response of output to be weaker.
Therefore, the more ﬂexible the wages are, the stronger is the lever that monetary policy has
on inﬂation. In addition, less sticky wages also mean less persistent inﬂation.
c) Lower Hiring Costs/Lower Costs of Posting Vacancies
We next analyze a scenario that can be interpreted literally as reduced costs to ﬁrms associated
with hiring but also as reduced costs to ﬁrms of separation. The blue dashed line in Figure 2
shows the eﬀect of a monetary easing when steady state vacancy posting costs, κ, are only 1/16
of their value in the baseline. Vacancy posting costs do not have a direct impact on the marginal
costs, and thus inﬂation, because they are treated as sunk costs in the production phase. In
equilibrium, however, they still matter for inﬂation as they aﬀect the steady state employment
and market tightness, and thereby the use of the intensive margin. On the one hand, in- and
31 With wages as rigid as in the baseline, newly negotiated nominal and real wages rise but average real wages
fall (since in the short-run the nominal wage rate of most employees is ﬁxed and inﬂation increases).
32 Equation (31) suggests that the smaller the curvature of the production function, α, the larger the eﬀect of
a monetary shock on inﬂation. As in Trigari (2006), in our model also habit persistence bears on the use of
the extensive relative to the intensive margin, since habits smooth out and prolong the eﬀects of any shock
on proﬁts and thus aﬀect hiring. With diﬀerent choices for these parameters, however, the most material
change in business cycle behavior arises when wage rigidity is aﬀected, while the eﬀect on the business cycle
is considerably less pronounced for the other ﬂexible labor market scenarios.
27Figure 2: Impulse responses to 25bps monetary policy shock: ﬂexible labor market
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Notes: The panels show percentage responses (1 in the plots corresponds to 1%) of endogenous variables to
a
1
4% monetary policy shock. The black solid line marks the calibrated model. The blue dashed line
shows the case when vacancy posting costs, κ, are 1/16 of their size in the baseline. All other parameters
are as in the baseline. The steady state features s = .65, u = .045, y = 1.04, h = 0.3296 and A = 544.5. The
red dotted line marked by circles corresponds to a scenario with a lower replacement rate, mirroring
the U.S. level,
b
wh = 40%. All parameters apart from b are left at their baseline values. The steady state
features s = .55, u = .052, y = 1.058, h = 0.34, A = 43.6. An increase in unemployment of 1 in the plot
means that the unemployment rate increases by 1% above steady state, say, from 9.1% to 9.19%.
out-of steady state, ﬁrms will use the hiring margin more intensively. This reduces both the
level and the response of hours per employee and thus reduces the percentage response of the
marginal product of labor and of the worker’s disutility of work to shocks. This line of argument
suggests that the inﬂationary response would be reduced; compare equation (31). On the other
hand, and countervailing, with lower vacancy costs, the labor market is also considerably tighter
for ﬁrms. This by itself would mean that wages are more responsive to shocks.
While the latter eﬀect is visible in the wage response, for inﬂation the former eﬀect prevails. On
average more vacancies are opened. This results in a steady state job-ﬁnding rate of s = 65%
per quarter, so unemployed workers ﬁnd a job as quickly as in the U.S.; compare Table 8 in the
Appendix. The steady state unemployment rate drops to u = 4.4%. Ex-post labor revenues per
ﬁrm are lower than in the baseline steady state. Not least since job-related ﬁxed costs remain
constant at the same time, labor proﬁts and employment on the extensive margin react more
28strongly (in percentage terms) to the monetary policy shock. Therefore the additional output
is produced with less recourse to the intensive margin,   ht, with a dampening eﬀect on inﬂation.
As a result, despite real wage rates being slightly more responsive (falling by less), marginal
costs and inﬂation rise by less than in the baseline.33
d) Lower Unemployment Beneﬁts
A reduction in unemployment beneﬁts, b, reduces the outside option of the worker. This means
that – all else equal – wages are lower in the new steady state, which reduces equilibrium
unemployment. For a given level of output, ﬁrms need to make less use of the intensive margin,
with the dampening eﬀect on inﬂation that we already described in c). On the other hand, there
are now two countervailing eﬀects: First, lower wages, all else equal, also mean that the ﬁrm will
demand more labor at the intensive margin; cp. equation (25). This means that the sign of any
change in the steady state level of hours is ambiguous, and similarly for the hourly wage rate.
Also, output increases. Second, and as for vacancy posting costs, any expansion may require
more of a recourse to hours per worker since the pool of unemployed workers who could satisfy
additional demand for labor is smaller after the reform. This would lead to a stronger response
of marginal costs and inﬂation to shocks.
To assess the eﬀect quantitatively, we considerably reduce the replacement rate to b
wh = 40%, so
as to mimic the average replacement rate in the U.S.; cp. Engen and Gruber (2001) and Table
8 in the Appendix. All parameters apart from b are left at the same values as in the baseline.
The steady state features a level of output that exceeds the baseline by almost 6% and the pool
of unemployed workers shrinks to u = 5.2%. Because of the latter, even though the percent
response of unemployment (see the red dotted line marked by circles in Figure 2) is similar to
the baseline, the percent response of the number of employees is smaller. Therefore, eventually,
more of the additional demand has to be satisﬁed out of hours worked per employee. This
reduces the marginal product of labor – but also the real hourly wage – by slightly more than in
the baseline. Overall, marginal costs and therefore inﬂation rise by more than in the baseline.
33 In our baseline calibration unemployment features a semi-elasticity of unemployment with respect to beneﬁts
of 1.7, very close to the value of 2 favored by Costain and Reiter (2008). Fixed costs are essential in generating
this reasonable elasticity of unemployment with respect to beneﬁts. In a similar vein, the results of paragraphs
c) and d) also depend on the presence of ﬁxed costs of production. Absent ﬁxed costs, unemployment would
be hardly more responsive to changes of economic conditions when beneﬁts or vacancy costs change, and the
dynamics of inﬂation would thus be little aﬀected. These graphs are available upon request.
29Quantitatively, however, the transmission of monetary policy to inﬂation still remains close to
the baseline. This is the case despite the paradigm shift that the reduction in the replacement
rate means for the economy’s potential output. Also the response of output, in percentage terms,
resembles closely the response in the baseline economy.
e) Bargaining Power of Workers Below the Status Quo
The theoretical implications of a change in bargaining power are comparable to changes in the
replacement rate. However, changes in the replacement rate aﬀect the level of the total surplus,
while changes in bargaining power aﬀect primarily the distribution of the joint surplus of ﬁrms
and workers. We therefore also examined how a lower bargaining power of workers would aﬀect
the transmission of a monetary easing.34 We found that hours worked would respond similarly
to the previous scenarios, the eﬀect on the marginal product of labor being cushioned by a
slightly stronger fall in the real wage. As a result, in an economy with a lower bargaining power
of workers, the eﬀect of a monetary policy impulse on marginal costs, inﬂation and output would
be very similar to the response in the baseline economy, again, despite noticeable diﬀerences in
the implied steady state. We do not display these responses.
f) Lower Amount of Job-related Fixed Costs
Figure 3 depicts the eﬀect of a monetary easing when changes in institutions induced smaller
job-related ﬁxed costs. Ex ante lower ﬁxed costs increase ﬁrms’ hiring incentives and thus reduce
equilibrium unemployment. Similar to the previous discussions, on the one hand this reduces the
responses of inﬂation, since ﬁrms are more likely to hire in an upturn; on the other hand it also
strongly increases steady state labor market tightness, leading ﬁrms to make more recourse to
the intensive margin; cp. the discussion of equation (32). The latter dominates in the numerical
examples. The blue dashed line assumes that the overhead component of ﬁxed costs, ΦL, is
reduced to zero. All other parameters remain at their baseline values. This seemingly small
change induces a fall in the steady state unemployment rate to u = 7.5%. Since ﬁxed costs
are lower, percentage labor proﬁts react by less than in the baseline model, and so do hiring
and unemployment. More of the required adjustment of employment is borne by hours worked
34 We reduced the workers’ bargaining power from η = .5 to η = .2. All other parameters were as in the baseline.
The resulting steady state featured the following values: s = .37, u = .074, y = 1.02 and A = 77.2.
30Figure 3: Impulse responses to 25bps monetary policy shock: job-related ﬁxed costs
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Notes: The panels show percentage responses (1 in the plots corresponds to 1%) of endogenous variables
to a
1
4% monetary policy shock for varying sizes of job-related ﬁxed costs. The black solid line marks
the calibrated model. The blue dashed line sets the overhead component of ﬁxed costs to Φ
L = 0. All
other parameters remain at their values in the baseline calibration. The associated steady state features
y = 1.0007, s = .37, q = .51, h = .325, u = .075, A = 77.36. The red dotted line marked by circles
shows the case where in addition the capital component of ﬁxed costs is reduced by 10%, Φ
K = .30, Φ
L = 0.
All other parameters remain at their baseline values. This implies a steady state with y = 0.992, s = .90,
q = .13, h = .29, u = .0322, A = 19.06.
per employee. Consequently, the marginal product of labor falls by more than in the baseline.
Therefore marginal costs and inﬂation rise by slightly more, with the increase in marginal costs
being somewhat cushioned by a stronger fall in real hourly wages. Further to this, the red dotted
line marked by circles shows the economy’s response to the monetary easing when, in addition,
ﬁxed costs associated with capital are reduced (by 10% in the example, so ΦK = 0.3, ΦL = 0).
This change means that steady state unemployment rates are lower still, at u = 3.2%. Labor
adjustment in response to the monetary easing shifts further to the intensive margin with a
smaller and less protracted response (in percent deviation from steady state) in unemployment
and a more pronounced rise in marginal costs and inﬂation. Still, despite the sizable eﬀect that
lower ﬁxed costs have on the steady state of the economy, quantitatively the transmission of the
monetary impulse to output and inﬂation appears to be little aﬀected.
314.2 The Business Cycle when Labor Markets Are More Flexible
So far we have exclusively reported on the role of the labor market for the transmission of
monetary policy shocks. But for the other business cycle shocks in the calibrated model, reduc-
ing wage rigidity as well is the one change in labor market structure that quantitatively most
signiﬁcantly aﬀects their transmission – and thus overall business cycle ﬂuctuations. This is
shown in Table 5, which reports the standard deviations for selected variables under the diﬀer-
ent scenarios presented above. A lower degree of nominal wage rigidity reduces the volatility of
Table 5: More ﬂexible labor markets and business cycle ﬂuctuations
More ﬂexible labor market through lower ...
Standard Base- Wage Vacancy Replace- Bargaining Fixed
deviation of line rigidity costs ment rate power costs
  yt .85 .60 .96 .76 .85 .73
  Rt .18 .21 .18 .19 .18 .19
  Π
yoy
t .31 .71 .25 .38 .31 .41
  ht .94 .78 .79 1.08 1.00 1.17
  wt .20 .49 .20 .21 .21 .20
change of std. dev. of   Π
yoy
t + 129% - 19% +22% ≈ 0% +32%
Notes: The table reports standard deviations of variables in the baseline model to the implied standard de-
viations under scenarios with more ﬂexible labor markets. All model moments are unconditional moments.
From top to bottom: output,   yt, the nominal rate,   Rt, year-on-year inﬂation,   Π
yoy
t , average hours per
employee,   ht, and average real hourly wage,   wt. From left to right: baseline, lower wage rigidity (γ = .5),




, lower bargaining power of






. The previous ﬁgures and the main text
contain more details about the scenarios. The ﬁnal line of the table reports the percentage change in the
standard deviation of inﬂation in the respective scenarios relative to baseline.
output and hours per employee and induces notably more pronounced ﬂuctuations of inﬂation
over the business cycle. Table 5 suggests that the standard deviation of inﬂation would increase
by 65% if the average duration of wage contracts were cut to one-third of the baseline duration,
i.e., to an average duration of half a year. In contrast, the other structural changes that would
make the labor market more ﬂexible but which would not directly touch on wage rigidity do
not have as much of an impact on the business cycle. Lowering the replacement rate to the
level witnessed in the U.S. would raise the standard deviation of inﬂation but by less, namely,
by 23%. Lowering ﬁxed costs associated with jobs increases inﬂation volatility by 26%. As the
previous discussion would have suggested, lowering the bargaining power hardly has any eﬀect
32on inﬂation volatility. And a reduction in vacancy posting costs would (through a more intense
use of the extensive margin) reduce inﬂation volatility by about 19%.35
5 The Role of Labor Market Shocks - A Bayesian Estimation
So far, we analyzed to which extent the business cycle is aﬀected by permanent changes in the
underlying institutions governing the labor market. In this section, we analyze whether – given
the current state of labor market institutions – shocks originating in the labor market are an
important source of ﬂuctuations in production and prices, which would likely render these shocks
valuable information for monetary policy.
To elicit the labor market shocks, we estimate the model economy using Bayesian techniques.36
We make use of standard macroeconomic variables as well as of variables characterizing the
labor market. We employ as observable variables the series for output, year-on-year inﬂation,
the nominal interest rate, wages per employee, unemployment, total hours worked and vacancies.
We are aware of the measurement problems of the latter two series as described in Section 3.
Nonetheless these series appear to be at the core of the search and matching literature and are
crucial for the identiﬁcation of parameters.37 We also include government spending in our set
of observable time series in order to identify the government spending shock. Besides the four
shocks already embedded in the calibrated version, the estimated model allows for a non-zero
cost-push shock, and three labor market shocks: a shock to the bargaining power of workers,
ηt, a shock to the separation rate, ϑt, and a shock to vacancy posting costs, κt. The rationale
for the choice of these three labor market shocks is as follows. We abstract from an endogenous
separation decision of ﬁrms. At the same time some observers of the business cycle point to
35 We have analyzed the sensitivity of the above results with respect to diﬀerent values of the labor supply
elasticity ϕ. The main result, that removing wage rigidity has a bigger impact on monetary transmission and
inﬂation volatility than the other scenarios, is robust, and the diﬀerence becomes the more pronounced, the
less elastic the labor supply (the larger ϕ). The corresponding tables and ﬁgures are available upon request.
36 The Bayesian estimation strategy allows us to use as many shocks as observable variables and to choose
the shocks according to their economic meaning and to evaluate the choice along econometric criteria. As
described in Section 3 the choice of shocks in the calibration approach is restricted by the property that the
shocks must be easily identiﬁable. In the calibrated model we therefore abstained from shocks like the price
mark-up shock.
37 We conducted an extensive sensitivity analysis with respect to using the German set of proxies for euro area
hours worked and vacancies, and with respect to estimating diﬀerent sets of parameters. The results are robust
to these changes. The corresponding tables are available upon request.
33ﬂuctuations in separations as important driving forces of employment ﬂuctuations, with potential
implications for inﬂation and output. To account for variations along the separation margin we
thus include a stochastic element in the form of a shock to the separation rate.38 Similarly,
our model abstracts from many of the details that aﬀect the bargaining process between ﬁrms
and (often-times unionized) workers, and their relative bargaining positions. The shock to the
bargaining power captures exogenous variations that drive the outcome of the bargaining process.
Finally, the shock to the vacancy posting costs captures variations in institutional features and
other factors that have a bearing on the incentives to hire over and above ﬂuctuations in wages,
and which are not fully captured in the theoretical model.39
Our paper is placed within a growing literature that estimates dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium (DSGE) models by means of Bayesian techniques; see e.g. Schorfheide (2000) and Smets
and Wouters (2003, 2007). Model estimates provide a complete characterization of the data-
generating process. For this paper, that means that the estimation will in particular inform on
the relative importance of shocks in the labor market.40
In a Bayesian framework prior information (derived from earlier studies, outside evidence or
informed judgement) can be brought to bear on the estimation process in a consistent and
transparent manner. The following section discusses the priors we use in our application.
5.1 Fixed Parameters and Priors
It is standard practice to estimate certain parameters while keeping others ﬁxed at their cali-
brated values; cp., e.g., Smets and Wouters (2003). In particular, there are a number of param-
38 In our model, shocks to the separation rate lead to both higher unemployment and more vacancy posting.
Separation shocks therefore weaken the Beveridge curve in the model; yet they do not destroy it altogether:
In the estimated version of the model reported below, unemployment and vacancies are negatively correlated,
but weaker so than in the data. A graph is available upon request. Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) stress
that the outside option in the bargaining matters for the sign of the correlations conditional on the separation
shock.
39 Our paper treats all the available labor market series as observable, which allows us to identify these three
labor market shocks. In contrast, Gertler, Sala, and Trigari (2008) estimate their New Keynesian model with
labor market frictions by using only the variables that Smets and Wouters (2007) also use. In particular, they
do not allow for a diﬀerence in hours worked at the intensive and extensive margin, which may be due to
their focus on the U.S. Similarly they do not include vacancies as an observable series. This means that they
identify only one labor market shock, the bargaining power shock.
40 This distinguishes the Bayesian techniques from the structural VAR approach used, e.g., in Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Evans (2005), which focuses on identifying only a subset of shocks in the economy. For the U.S.,
e.g., Trigari (2004) identiﬁes the response of labor market variables and other macro variables to monetary
policy shocks.
34eters which are well-identiﬁed on the basis of long-run averages and great ratios but for which
little information is contained in the HP-ﬁltered data we use in the estimation. This is the case
for the following parameters: β is identiﬁed by the average real interest rate. α is identiﬁed by
the labor share. ϑ is identiﬁed by the micro-level separation rate and ΦK by the capital share.
g is the mean share of government spending in GDP. In the estimation process these parameters
therefore remain ﬁxed at their values given in Table 2. Also the replacement rate, b
wh, is well-
identiﬁed on the basis of outside evidence, e.g., the OECD Labor Force Survey; see Appendix
B.1. We further retain the convention that κL targets hours worked per employee, h = 1
3, and
that steady state vacancy posting costs, κ, and the eﬃciency of matching, σm, continue to target
mean job-ﬁlling rates, which are identiﬁed by outside data as discussed in Section 3, and mean
unemployment. Further, in the linearized model the elasticity of demand, ǫ, multiplies only
the cost-push shock. The demand elasticity is thus not empirically distinguishable from the
standard deviation of the shock. We therefore ﬁx it at the calibrated value of ǫ = 11. Similarly,
we initially ﬁx the bargaining power of workers, η, at the value in Table 2, since it is not well
identiﬁed by the model’s dynamics.41 In addition, we initially keep parameter A ﬁxed, which
links wage and proﬁt ﬂuctuations, reﬂecting our prior that the model should be enabled to en-
dogenously explain a signiﬁcant share of the ﬂuctuations in unemployment through endogenous
transmission of business cycle shocks. None of the results reported here changes qualitatively
when η and A are estimated alongside the other parameters.
This still leaves us with 26 parameters to estimate. There are four parameters related to mon-
etary policy in the Taylor rule: the interest rate smoothing coeﬃcient, γR, and the response
parameters to inﬂation, the output gap and output growth, γπ, γy and γ∆y. Three parame-
ters relate to preferences, namely, the curvature of the disutility of work, ϕ, risk aversion, σ,
and habit persistence, ̺. Three parameters relate to the labor market, namely, the probability
that wage contracts are not updated, γ, the degree of wage indexation, ξw, and the elasticity
of matches with respect to unemployment, ξ. Finally, two parameters relate to the wholesale
sector: the probability that prices are not updated, ω, and the degree of price indexation, ξp.
41 η could be conjectured to have a signiﬁcant impact on the steady state and thereby on economic dynamics. In
our estimation procedure we target a number of steady state variables, in particular steady state unemployment
and the replacement rate. Therefore “slack parameters” like κ,κ
L, and σm partly undo the eﬀect of changes
in η on the dynamics of the economy. The main impact of a change in η in the linearized dynamic system is
to scale the impact of a shock to the bargaining power, meaning that the standard deviation of a bargaining
power shock cannot easily be discerned from the level of the bargaining power parameter η.
35The remaining 14 parameters refer to the stochastic structure of the model.
The ﬁrst three columns of Table 6 report our priors for these parameters. The center of the
prior distribution for each parameter is in line with the discussion of parameters in the calibrated
version of the model (see Section 3), and with the literature, e.g., Smets and Wouters (2003).
Overall, priors for the estimated parameters are fairly wide, leaving space for the data to inform
about the parameters.42 Tighter priors are further chosen for parameters for which there is
strong outside evidence, as most notably is the case for the Calvo probabilities of not re-setting
wages and prices, γ and ω, or for parameters for which there is previous estimation evidence.
5.2 Estimation Results
The ﬁnal ﬁve columns of Table 6 report information on the posterior distribution of the param-
eters. For most of the parameters, the data are informative, meaning prior and posterior mean
do not coincide and the posterior standard deviation is tighter than for the prior distribution,
albeit to a diﬀerent degree. Economically, the parameter estimates appear to be reasonable.
The estimates for the monetary policy reaction function are within the standard range of values
found in the literature. In terms of preferences, values for the labor supply elasticity and the
risk-aversion parameter remain close to their priors, while the degree of habit persistence that
we estimate has a posterior mean value of ̺ = 0.22, which is at the low end of values considered
in the literature.
Turning to the labor market parameters, the estimates suggest less wage rigidity than incorpo-
rated into the priors; namely, the median wage duration suggested by the median estimate of
γ = 0.68 is just above three quarters, possibly reﬂecting that employer-union bargaining intervals
ﬁx only the pay scale while employers retain some ﬂexibility of allocating workers along the pay
scale over the cycle, and some ﬂexibility of adjusting performance pay components. The degree
of wage indexation, ξw, is below the prior mean but still points to considerable indexation. The
elasticity of matches with respect to unemployment is estimated to have a mean of ξ = 0.68,
which is within the bounds provided by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), if at the upper end.
Price stickiness, ω, is relatively mild in our estimates, amounting to a median duration of prices
42 At the same time, it is apparent that priors need to be somewhat informative in order to attain economi-
cally reasonable parameter estimates. Compare the discussion in Onatski and Williams (2004) of Smets and
Wouters’ (2003) priors.
36Table 6: Parameter estimates
prior posterior posterior
mean std distr. mean std 2.5% median 97.5%
Monetary policy
γR .85 .1 beta .80 .03 .74 .80 .86
γπ 1.5 .2 gamma 1.62 .19 1.25 1.61 1.99
γy .5 .2 gamma .43 .15 .17 .42 .73
γ∆y 0 .2 normal .12 .04 .05 .11 .19
Preferences
ϕ 2 .5 gamma 1.63 .44 1.01 1.54 2.50
σ 1.5 .2 gamma 1.44 .20 1.06 1.43 1.82
̺ .7 .1 beta .22 .05 .13 .22 .32
Labor market
γ .83 .05 beta .68 .05 .59 .68 .77
ξw .5 .25 uniform .44 .20 .06 .42 .82
ξ .6 .05 beta .68 .03 .61 .67 .74
Wholesale/price-setting ﬁrms
ω .75 .05 beta .69 .03 .63 .69 .75
ξp .5 .25 uniform .17 .09 .01 .17 .34
Serial correlation of shocks
ρb .5 .2 beta .79 .04 .69 .79 .87
ρg .5 .2 beta .73 .06 .62 .73 .84
ρz .5 .2 beta .60 .07 .48 .61 .74
ρη .5 .2 beta .09 .05 .01 .08 .18
ρκ .5 .2 beta .78 .06 .65 .79 .91
ρϑ .5 .2 beta .51 .08 .37 .51 .66
Standard deviation of innovations
σb 50 28.67 uniform .26 .08 .14 .25 .42
σC 50 28.67 uniform 1.94 .39 1.28 1.89 2.72
σg 50 28.67 uniform .48 .04 .41 .48 .55
σmoney 50 28.67 uniform .12 .01 .10 .12 .14
σz 50 28.67 uniform .39 .03 .33 .39 .45
ση 50 28.67 uniform 43.48 18.4 16.4 38.9 84.0
σκ 50 28.67 uniform 7.62 .87 6.04 7.53 9.40
σϑ 50 28.67 uniform 3.47 .26 2.97 3.46 3.98
Notes: Parameter estimates in the baseline model. The estimation sample is 1984Q1 to 2006Q4.
Data from 1980Q1 to 1983Q4 are used in addition, in order to initialize the Kalman ﬁlter. Second
column: prior mean, third column: prior standard deviation. Fourth column: prior distribution
of parameters. The ﬁnal columns show the posterior mean, the posterior standard deviation and
the posterior median bracketed by a 95% coverage interval. The posterior estimates are based on
500,000 draws.
37of somewhat more than three quarters. There is only mild evidence for price indexation, with
mean ξp = 0.17. Turning to the shock processes, despite starting from identical priors, estimates
of serial correlation coeﬃcients and the standard deviation of the innovations diﬀer considerably.
The estimates point toward the risk-premium shock and the vacancy posting shock as the most
persistent shocks in the model economy.43 At the other end of the spectrum, the shock to the
workers’ bargaining power is estimated to be almost white noise. Appendix D provides measures
of ﬁt for the estimated and the calibrated model and compares their implications.44
5.3 The Importance of Labor Market Shocks
Closely monitoring labor market developments can be important for monetary policy makers if
these developments ultimately have a non-negligible eﬀect on inﬂation and output. Using the
posterior distribution of parameters, we can assess the importance of the respective labor market
shocks in determining ﬂuctuations of speciﬁc variables in the estimated model. Toward this end,
Table 7 reports the median contribution of labor market shocks to the forecast error variance of
selected variables along with 95% conﬁdence intervals. Shown are two diﬀerent forecast horizons
(Table 11 in Appendix D reports the forecast error variance decomposition for all shocks and
variables and also for the long term).
As shown in Table 7, labor market shocks such as the shock to the cost of posting a vacancy
as well as a shock to the job separation rate contribute substantially to the ﬂuctuations in
unemployment and vacancies in the short as well as in the medium run. However, these shocks
seem to be of only minor importance for ﬂuctuations in output and inﬂation. This can be
explained as follows. On the one hand, shocks to the vacancy posting costs and separation
rate are neither large nor very persistent. Stickiness in wages and prices further reduce the
impact of current shocks on average wages and inﬂation. Besides, at the parameter estimates,
the presence of the intensive margin to some extent isolates wages from these shocks, leaving
only the eﬀect through the marginal product of labor on inﬂation. Yet while these shocks make
43 The estimation uses HP-ﬁltered data. As a result, in our estimated model there is no shock with a permanent
eﬀect on output.
44 Figure 5 in the Appendix compares the impulse responses in both model versions. The estimation is informa-
tive. The estimated model shows less persistence than the calibrated model. Wages in the estimated model
are just as sticky as prices. As a result, real wages rise upon a monetary easing while they fall in the baseline,
which in part explains the somewhat stronger response of inﬂation in the estimated model.
38Table 7: Contribution of labor market shocks to forecast error variance
bargaining power vacancy cost separation rate all labor shocks
Horizon 2
  yt 8.0 3.6; 15.5 .3 .07 ; .9 .1 .02; .7 8.5 3.9; 16.4
  Π
yoy
t 12.0 7.5; 19.2 .3 .1; .7 .6 .2; 1.3 13.1 8.5; 20.3
  ut .8 .1; 2.4 16.5 9.9; 24.5 64.3 48.8; 78.9 82.3 70.9; 90.8
  vt 3.5 .9; 9.2 46.5 34.3; 57.6 6.2 3.7; 10.7 56.2 43.4; 68.5
  wt 67.4 53.8; 78.3 .1 .05; .3 .04 .0007; .3 67.7 54.1; 78.5
Horizon 10
  yt 16.7 8.7; 29.8 1.7 .4; 6.6 .6 .1; 2.6 19.8 9.9; 34.3
  Π
yoy
t 11.9 6.4; 22.7 1.2 .4; 3.1 .7 .2; 1.8 14.1 8.1; 25.5
  ut 6.0 2.4; 14.0 43.4 26.2; 63.8 24.2 13.0; 43.2 76.6 56.1; 89.7
  vt 5.4 2.1; 12.5 47.3 33.3; 64.6 6.7 3.5; 13.0 60.7 45.8; 75.4
  wt 59.5 43.3; 73.4 .8 .1; 3.1 .1 .01; .7 60.8 44.6; 74.3
Notes: Contribution of labor market shocks to the forecast error variance for two diﬀerent forecast
horizons (in percent). Shown are median values and 95% conﬁdence intervals. From top to bottom:
output, annual inﬂation, unemployment, vacancies and the real wage rate. From left to right:
bargaining power shock, vacancy posting cost shock and shock to the separation rate. The ﬁnal
column reports the median value and conﬁdence bands of the joint contribution of all three shocks.
Note: entries in the ﬁnal column do not need to be the sum of entries in previous columns. Entries
are based on 10,000 draws from the posterior distribution. The variance decomposition into all
shocks is reported in Table 11 in Appendix D.
a sizable contribution to employment dynamics, ﬂuctuations in employment on the extensive
margin empirically may not be large enough to have much of an eﬀect on the intensive margin and
inﬂation, that is, relative to other sources of ﬂuctuations in inﬂation in the estimated model.45
The shock to the bargaining power of workers, in contrast, does explain a signiﬁcant share of the
ﬂuctuations not only of wages but also of output and inﬂation. The eﬀect on output ﬂuctuations
is 8% in the short run, and in the medium run ﬂuctuations in the bargaining power explain about
16%. Similarly, the shock to the bargaining power of workers accounts for about 12% of the
forecast error variance of inﬂation in the short and medium run. In terms of unemployment and
vacancies, the shock to the bargaining power of workers accounts for about 6% of the forecast
error variance of each in the medium run.46 The bargaining power shock aﬀects wages and thus
45 In the model, employment is predetermined and ﬁrms can demand hours worked per employee ﬂexibly along
their labor demand curve. In particular, adjustment along the intensive margin does not require any further
outlays by the ﬁrm. The intensive margin is therefore too volatile in the model relative to the data; cp. Tables
4 and 10. Non-labor-market shocks explain most of the variation on the intensive margin.
46 To square this result with Section 4.1. it is important to note that impulse response functions to other shocks
may not vary much with the calibrated size of the bargaining power, while the direct impact of a bargaining
power shock on observed variable ﬂuctuations can matter. Using the Kalman smoother and the median
parameter estimates, we ﬁnd that shocks to the bargaining power are indeed close to white noise but shocks
39marginal costs directly. There are no countervailing eﬀects on wages: A positive shock makes
wages rise unambiguously – and notably so on average, since the estimated shocks are quite
large. Shocks to the bargaining power therefore feed through to wages and inﬂation despite
sticky prices and wages.
In sum, it appears that disturbances to the bargaining power of workers contain valuable infor-
mation for the central bank for evaluating the evolution of inﬂation and output. In contrast,
shocks to the costs of hiring or shocks to the job separation rate matter much more for the
evolution of labor market variables than they would for explaining output and inﬂation.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we employed a New Keynesian model with a non-Walrasian labor market to inves-
tigate the role of rigid labor markets for euro area monetary policy along two dimensions. First,
we analyzed to which extent a more ﬂexible labor market would alter the business cycle and in
particular the transmission of monetary policy. We investigated the relevance of a higher degree
of ﬂexibility of wages, of lower overhead labor costs, of a lower bargaining power of workers, of
lower vacancy posting costs and of a lower level of unemployment beneﬁts for monetary policy.
Second, we investigated to which extent labor market shocks, such as disturbances in the va-
cancy posting process, shocks to the separation rate, and disturbances in wage-bargaining, are
important determinants of business cycle ﬂuctuations and hence contain valuable information
for the monetary policy maker.
First, we ﬁnd that the importance of labor market rigidities for the business cycle in general
and for the transmission of monetary policy in particular crucially depends on the nature of the
labor market rigidity. A more ﬂexible labor market environment that is characterized by a lower
degree of wage rigidity makes monetary policy more eﬀective; i.e., a monetary policy easing feeds
faster into inﬂation. In contrast, altering other labor market characteristics, such as lowering
overhead labor costs of ﬁrms, reducing the net replacement rate of unemployment insurance or
lowering the cost of hiring, does not have as signiﬁcant an impact on the transmission of shocks
in our model. This is so although these changes to the underlying structure of the labor market
can be sizable. Wage and price indexation, as well as other rigidities and persistent monetary policy, can mean
that even shocks with little serial correlation can have a lasting and important impact on the economy.
40imply substantial changes in the steady state of the economy.
Second, we ﬁnd that shocks to the bargaining power of workers, in particular, contain valuable
information for the central bank for evaluating inﬂation and output dynamics. In contrast,
shocks to the costs of posting a vacancy or to the job separation rate do not appear to be
of importance in explaining dynamics in output and inﬂation. We, therefore, conclude that
while the labor market matters for monetary policy, some labor market features are of more
importance for the monetary policy maker than others. For example, while monetary policy
may not need to react to hiring and separation shocks, closely monitoring the wage process and
wage-bargaining disturbances is likely to provide valuable information for monetary stabilization
policy.
In total, the labor market may be crucial for monetary policy in two dimensions, namely, in
altering the transmission of shocks through the economy – and thus altering the business cycle
– and in aﬀecting the evolution of the economy itself through labor market shocks. In both
dimensions we ﬁnd that the labor market is of key importance insofar as wage-setting is con-
cerned. The paper thus lends some support to central bank practice in the euro area that closely
monitors wage developments but assigns less weight to other labor market information.
For future research it would be interesting to further study the interaction of the labor mar-
ket with other markets in the economy in the framework of a DSGE model, and it would be
interesting to conduct optimal policy exercises so as to study further the implications of labor
market rigidities for monetary policy-making from a normative point of view.
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44A Appendix
A.1 Steady State of the Model Economy
Nominal rate: R = 1
β.
Marginal utility of consumption: λ = (c − ̺c)
−σ .
Marginal cost and price of labor good: mc = xL = ǫ−1
ǫ .
Matches: m = σmuξv1−ξ.
Employment: ϑn = m.
Unemployment u = 1 − n.
Probability of ﬁnding a worker: q = m
v .
Probability of ﬁnding a job: s = m
u .











Deﬁnition marginal rate of substitution: mrs = κLhϕ
λ .
Value of labor ﬁrm: J = 1
1−β(1−ϑ)ΨL.
Period proﬁt of a labor ﬁrm: ΨL = xLzhα − wh − Φ.
Surplus of representative family: ∆ = 1
1−β(1−ϑ−s)
 




Hours FOC: w = xLzαhα−1.
Vacancy posting - zero proﬁt condition: κ = qβJ.
Resource constraint: y = c + g + κv + nΦL.
Production: y = nzhα.
Period proﬁt of a goods diﬀerentiation ﬁrm: ΨC = (1 − mc)y.
A.2 Linearized Model Economy
Consumption Euler equation:   λt = Et
 
  λt+1 +   Rt +   ǫb
t −   Πt+1
 
,
where   λt = − σ
1−̺ (  ct − ̺  ct−1).
New Keynesian Phillips curve:   Πt =
ξp
1+βξp









ω   mct,
where   mct =   eC
t +   xL
t .
Matching:   mt = ξ  ut + (1 − ξ)  vt.
Employment stock:   nt = (1 − ϑ)  nt−1 + m
n   mt−1 − ϑ  ϑt.
45Link employment to unemployment:   nt = − u
1−u  ut.
Probability of ﬁnding a worker:   qt =   mt −   vt.
Probability of ﬁnding a job:   st =   mt −   ut.
Bargaining FOC:   J∗
t +   δ W
t =   ∆∗
t +   δF
t − 1
1−η  ηt.
Aggregate hours index:   xL
t +   zt + (α − 1)  ht =   wt.
Evolution of aggregate real wage:   wt = γ
 
  wt−1 −   Πt + ξw  Πt−1
 
+ (1 − γ)  w∗
t.
Law of motion of   δF
t :
  δF
t = [1 − β(1 − ϑ)γ]
 
−α





t +   zt
  






t −   Πt+1 + ξw  Πt −   w∗
t+1
 
+   δF





Law of motion of   δW
t :
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  λt+1 −   λt +   J∗
t+1
 
Evolution of   J∗
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t+1 +   Πt+1 −   w∗










46Evolution of   ∆∗
t:
∆  ∆∗




t +   xL
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t +   zt
 













t+1 +   Πt+1 −   w∗













t+1 +   Πt+1 −   wt − ξw  Πt
 
+(1 − ϑ − s)β∆Et
 









Resource constraint: y  yt = c  ct + g  gt + κv [  κt +   vt] + ΦLn  nt.
Aggregate production:   yt =   zt + α  ht +   nt.
Average proﬁts labor ﬁrm:   ΨL
t = A
 







Average wholesale proﬁts: ΨC   ΨC
t = (1 − mc)y   yt − y mc   mct.
Taylor rule:
  Rt = γR   Rt−1 + (1 − γR)
 
γπ




4 (  yt −   y ﬂex
t )
 
+ γ∆y [  yt −   yt−1] +   e
money
t .
Year-on-year inﬂation:   Π
yoy
t =   Πt +   Πt−1 +   Πt−2 +   Πt−3.
Flexible Price and Flexible Wage Economy
The monetary authority reacts to deviations of output from its putative value under ﬂexible
prices and ﬂexible wages. In calculating this ﬂex-price-ﬂex-wage output in t, yﬂex
t , we take the
values of the states of the actual economy prevailing in period t, e.g., the habit level ct−1, as
the states prevailing in the ﬂex-price-ﬂex-wage economy, too. This is the same concept used
to deﬁne the ﬂex-price output in Smets and Wouters (2003). The ﬂexible price, ﬂexible wage
economy duplicates the above system, setting price and wage rigidity to zero.
B Background Information for the Calibration
This section gives details on the calibration of the euro area replacement and separation rates.
47B.1 Replacement Rate
For the labor supply decision and the outside option of the worker the relevant replacement rate
is the net replacement rate, i.e., the replacement rate of after-tax (and after deduction of con-
tributions to social security) income. We resort to the OECD’s publication of net replacement
rates in its “Beneﬁts and Wages” publication. Since the net replacement income is not least
shaped by the tax code, which diﬀerentiates tax liabilities by family types, the OECD distin-
guishes between diﬀerent income characteristics and diﬀerent family characteristics. We follow
the OECD practice and take the simple average over the income categories of the replacement
rates when pre-unemployment income was, respectively, 67% and 100% of the income of an aver-
age production worker. We furthermore take simple averages over the family characteristics. We
use the latest vintage of the data available, which currently is 2004. Table 8 reports the eﬀective
net replacement rates by country thus computed for the euro area member states (excluding the
new entrants in 2007) and for the sake of comparison also for the U.K. and the U.S. Entries
in columns two through four refer to average replacement rates over six family characteristics
(single adult, one-earner married couple and two-earner married couple, each of these categories
once having two children and once without any children); entries in brackets exclude the two-
earner married couple characteristic from the averaging. Following the exposition of the OECD,
we report replacement rates for three diﬀerent durations of unemployment. First, in column two
we report replacement rates for the initial phase of unemployment. Second, in column three we
report replacement rates for the long-term unemployed (measured by the replacement rate in the
60th month of an unemployment spell). This measure includes any transfers received from social
assistance on top of unemployment beneﬁts. In column four, we report the average replacement
rate during an unemployment spell which lasts for ﬁve years. This statistic is not available for
two-earner married couples. We therefore report only the average over the remaining four family
characteristics (in brackets as before).47 Table 8 also reports summary statistics of the smallest
and the largest of the respective replacement rates over the 12 euro area countries, an equally
weighted average and an average using population weights in 2004, where these weights were
taken from the OECD “Labour Force Survey.”
47 The corresponding OECD tables are “Net replacement rates (NRR) during the initial phase of unemployment,
2001-2004,” “Net replacement rates (NRR) for long-term unemployed, 2001-2004” and “Net replacement rates
(NRR) over a 5-year period following unemployment, 2001-2004.”
48Table 8: Net replacement rates and unemployment duration as share of unemployed
Net replacement rate (%) Unemployment duration (months)
Country Initial month 60 Avg. 5 yrs. ≤ 5 6 to 11 12 to 23 ≥ 24
Euro area
Austria 70 (65) 69 (73) (67) 52 18 16 14
Belgium 72 (69) 67 (65) (66) 29 14 18 39
Germany 77 (71) 70 (75) (71) 29 15 19 36
Spain 78 (74) 44 (41) (52) 48 18 15 19
Finland 78 (77) 69 (72) (70) 48 19 16 17
France 82 (79) 60 (65) (68) 38 18 20 23
Greece 65 (64) 17 ( 2) (33) 29 16 21 34
Ireland 59 (55) 71 (71) (62) 43 19 16 22
Italy 63 (55) 19 ( 0) ( 6) 30 14 17 40
Luxembourg 88 (87) 69 (74) (51) 50 22 18 11
Netherlands 82 (81) 68 (77) (61) 35 19 21 24
Portugal 86 (84) 59 (61) (61) 34 19 22 26
Euro area min 59 (55) 17 ( 2) ( 6) 29 14 15 11
Euro area max 88 (87) 70 (77) (71) 52 22 22 40
Euro area average 75 (71) 57 (56) (56) 39 18 18 26
Pop.-weight avg. 75 (70) 52 (51) (53) 35 17 18 30
For comparison: non-euro area countries
U.K. 62 (61) 63 (66) (66) 55 16 13 16
U.S. 66 (59) 35 (26) (18) 73 21 6 0.2
Notes: Replacement rates and distribution of unemployment duration for the euro area by country and
for the U.K. and the U.S. All entries are in percent. For each category, the table also reports the largest
and smallest entry in the euro area, an unweighted average and a population-weighted average with 2004
population weights. Second to fourth columns: eﬀective net replacement rates, source: OECD, “Beneﬁts
and Wages.” Entries refer to an average over six family types (single adult, one-earner married couple,
two-earner married couple with 2 children and without children) and over the level of pre-unemployment
income of 67% of the average production worker wage (APW) and 100% of the average production worker
wage (for married couples the percent of APW relates to one spouse only; the second spouse is assumed
to be “inactive” with no earnings in a one-earner couple and to have full-time earnings equal to 67% of
APW in a two-earner couple. Children are ages 4 and 6.). Entries in brackets refer to an average over
four family types only (excluding the two-earner case). Second column: initial replacement rate. Third
column: replacement rate of a long-term unemployed, measured by the replacement rate 5 years after the
unemployment incidence. Column four: average net replacement rate over 60 months of unemployment, no
data for two-earner couples provided by the OECD, the numbers are averages over replacement rates when
the household receives social assistance and the case when it does not. Columns ﬁve to eight: decomposition
of the unemployed population by duration of unemployment. Source for European countries: OECD “Labour
Force Survey.” Averages from 2001Q1 to 2006Q4. Column ﬁve, duration of at most ﬁve months, column six:
unemployment duration of six to 11 months, column seven: share of the unemployed with an unemployment
duration of 12 to 23 months, ﬁnal column: share of the unemployed population with an unemployment
duration of at least two years. Data for the U.S. are taken from the “Labor Force Statistics from the Current
Population Survey” provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This reports unemployment by duration.
The 2001M1 to 2006M12 average is as follows. Unemployed less than 5 weeks: 36%, unemployed 5-14 weeks:
30%, unemployed 15 weeks to 26 weeks: 15% and unemployed 27 weeks and over: 19%. The numbers in
the table are estimates. The table assumes a geometric distribution of the length of unemployment. Exit
probabilities are estimated using the mean duration of unemployment of 17.3 weeks over the sample using
the corresponding data provided by the BLS.
49Turning to the average replacement rate, which is used as a calibration target, both simple
averages and population-weighted replacement rates give a similar picture: initial replacement
rates averaging over all family characteristics are around 75% in the euro area (ranging from 59%
in Ireland to 88% in Luxembourg). After 5 years of unemployment, the eﬀective net replacement
rate (including social assistance, family, housing and child-care beneﬁts) is on average roughly
55% for the euro area.48 With respect to the calibration target, we choose the average of the
replacement rates for the diﬀerent unemployment durations and set b
wh = 65%.
The ﬁnal four columns of Table 8 illustrate that longer-term unemployment is a common phe-
nomenon in the euro area. On average about 45% of the unemployment spells last at least a
year. This is in stark contrast to the length of unemployment spells in the UK and the contrast
is even starker compared to the U.S., underlining the sluggishness of the euro area labor market.
B.2 Separation Rates
We next turn to the calibration of the separation rate of ﬁrms and workers in the euro area. In
our model worker ﬂows and job ﬂows coincide. Whenever a worker is separated from a ﬁrm/job,
the ﬁrm/job ceases to exist. The same is not true for actual data in which worker ﬂows typically
exceed job ﬂows by a factor of two to three; for the U.S., see for instance Davis, Faberman,
and Haltiwanger (2006), for France see Blanchard (2005), Abowd et al. (1999), and for Portugal
see Blanchard and Portugal (2001). In addition, Burda and Wyplosz (1994), Bachmann (2005)
illustrate that there are substantial ﬂows of workers from both employment and unemployment
to out-of-the-labor-force for both France and Germany. Here we abstract from these ﬂows. Since
our model takes a simplifying view, we believe that the closest empirical proxy to the destruction
rate in our model is the job destruction rate.
No comprehensive study of job ﬂows and/or worker ﬂows concerned with job ﬂows at a monthly
or at least quarterly frequency exists for the euro area as a whole.49 We studied the available
evidence on separation for euro area individual countries from the perspective of worker ﬂows
48 This number already is strongly driven down by two outliers. Both Greece and Italy feature hardly any direct
unemployment beneﬁt or social assistance entitlement in the longer-term.
49 The frequency of observation is important, since low frequencies can mask labor market ﬂows between obser-
vation dates. For example, a worker who takes up employment in a diﬀerent job in each of the quarters of a
year will appear to have experienced just one job change in annual data; cp. Abowd, Corbel, and Kramarz
(1999).
50(which as argued provide an upper-bound on job ﬂows), and some direct evidence on job ﬂows.50
Furthermore we consulted experts in the Euro System to provide a qualitative assessment.
Complementary evidence is provided in Hobijn and Sahin (2007), who report indirect estimates
of separation rates for the full set of OECD countries. We take the evidence as suggestive of a
euro-area wide job destruction rate of about 3% per quarter.
Complementary information from a worker ﬂow perspective can be taken from Eurostat’s EU
Labour Force Survey, which collects quarterly information on the share of employed persons who
started a job within the past three months for each country of the European Union, see Table
9.51
Table 9: Share of persons whose job started within the past 3 months
Country Share pop. weight Country Share pop. weight
Austria 4.5 3% Greece 2.2 4%
Belgium 3.7 3% Ireland 4.7 1%
Germany 4.2 26% Italy 3.7 19%
Spain 7.6 14% Luxemburg 2.6 .2%
Finland 7.3 2% Netherlands 1.3 5%
France 6.2 20% Portugal 3.1 3%
Euro area min 1.3 0.2% For comparison:
Euro area max 7.6 26% U.K. 4.6 –
Euro area average 4.3 –
Pop.-weight avg. 4.8 –
Notes: Estimate of share of currently employed persons who have started a new job in the last
3 months for European countries. Source: EU Labour Force Survey, Table 12 of Eurostat’s
publication “Labour Market Latest Trends.” Data are available from 2004Q1 to 2006Q4 and
are not seasonally adjusted. Column two presents averages over these observations. For some
countries observations are not available for each quarter. This is the case for Germany (three
quarters missing), Ireland (one quarter missing) and Luxembourg (7 quarters missing). The
ﬁnal column reports population weights for the euro area member states, which were used to
compute the population-weighted average rate in the third to last row.
While the data presented in Table 9 cover only a relatively short time span (2004Q1 to 2006Q4),
it is nevertheless suggestive of worker ﬂows in the European Union. The evidence appears to
be roughly in line with that of our literature survey. Namely, Germany and Italy tend to have
50 See, e.g., Abowd, Corbel, and Kramarz (1999), Picart (2007), Burda and Wyplosz (1994) and Bachmann
(2005), Bertola and Ichino (1995) on evidence concerning worker ﬂows, and Abowd, Corbel, and Kramarz
(1999), Picart (2007), Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) and Blanchard and Portugal (2001) on respective evidence
on job ﬂows.
51 The data are published in Table 12 of Eurostat’s publication “Labour Market Latest Trends.”
51lower worker ﬂow rates than Spain and France. From a worker ﬂow perspective, these data for
the recent three years point to separation rates of at most 4.8% per quarter (including job-to-job
transitions). Taking into account that worker ﬂow data typically overestimate job ﬂows by a
factor of two to three, we are led to a job destruction rate between 1.6% and 2.4% during the
period of relatively weak growth that these data cover.
Overall, weighing the evidence above, we opt for calibrating our model to a quarterly job de-
struction rate of 3% for the euro area as a whole.
C Fit of the Calibrated Model
This section evaluates the ﬁt of the calibrated model beyond the standard deviations shown
in Section 3. Further evidence is contained in Table 10 in Appendix D. Figure 4 presents a
metric that can be used as a rough eyeball test to judge the calibrated model’s ﬁt. Each panel
plots the one-step Kalman-ﬁlter forecast, once the calibrated model is used to generate the
observation and the state equation (blue dotted line). The data shown are the same data we use
in estimating the full model. The actual data are shown as black solid lines. The exercise is the
following: output,   yt, interest rates,   Rt, wages per employee,   wt+  ht, and government spending,
  gt, are treated as observable data. We use these four series only, since the calibrated model with
the four shocks would be stochastically singular when using more than four observable data
series. The graphs thus reveal to which extent the model, absent the cost-push shock and the
three labor market shocks, can explain the evolution of all series. In particular, the smaller the
diﬀerence between the black solid line and the blue dotted line, the better the ﬁt of the model
in that particular dimension.
The calibrated model ﬁts the evolution of output, total hours worked, nominal rates, unemploy-
ment and government spending. For hours and unemployment this is the case despite the fact
that none of these series is treated as observable in the Kalman ﬁltering. Also for vacancies the
model infers the correct cyclical pattern, yet implies too much volatility at high frequencies. To
a satisfactory but not full extent the model ﬁts the evolution of wages per employee. Without a
cost-push shock, the model captures part of the pattern in inﬂation, yet to a much lesser extent
than for the other series. The importance of shocks to price (and wage) setting for the empirical
performance of monetary business cycle models is well-documented in the literature. In Smets
52Figure 4: Fit: actual data vs. Kalman-ﬁltered estimates using only four series
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Notes: The ﬁgures compare Kalman-ﬁltered one-step forecasts (for t given information up to t − 1) using the
calibrated model (blue dashed line) along with the actual data (black solid line). In each panel, a black solid
line marks the corresponding HP-ﬁltered series of actual data. The data used are the same as those used
for the estimation exercise in Section 5: output,   yt, interest rates,   Rt, the year-on-year inﬂation rate,   Π
yoy
t ,
total hours worked,   nt +   ht, the unemployment rate,   ut, vacancies,   vt, the wage per employee,   wt +   ht, and
government spending,   gt. The sample starts in 1980Q1 and ends in 2006Q4. The ﬁrst four years are used to
initialize the Kalman ﬁlter. Since the calibrated model features only four shocks, it is stochastically singular
when using more than four observable data series. For the Kalman ﬁltering underlying the above charts we
use the following four data series: output, interest rates, the wage per employee, and government spending.
and Wouters (2003), for example, price-markup and wage-markup shocks, respectively, explain
more than half of the share of the short-term forecast error variance of inﬂation and wages,
respectively. Similar ﬁndings obtain in our estimation exercise reported in Section 5.
D Estimation: Fit, Variance Decomposition, Impulse Responses
As a measure of how well both the estimated and the calibrated model match the data, Table
10 reports in-sample one-step root mean-squared errors (RMSEs) for the observable data in the
model (see the third column for the estimated model and the fourth column for the calibrated
model) and compares these to the RMSE in an unrestricted VAR(1) estimated on the same data
(see second column). The results indicate that the estimated model is competitive for output,
53Table 10: Root mean-squared error and standard deviation
RMSE standard deviation
Variable VAR estimated calibrated data estimated calibrated


















































Notes: The table compares root mean squared forecast errors (RMSEs) and standard deviations of variables
in the estimated and the calibrated model to the data. Column “RMSE-VAR”: RMSE in VAR(1), sample
1984:Q1 - 2006:Q4. Column “RMSE-estimated”: median RMSE, in brackets 95% conﬁdence interval; based
on 10,000 draws from the posterior parameter distribution; for each draw the RMSE is computed using
the actual data. The bounds therefore reﬂect parameter uncertainty but not data uncertainty. The table
also reports the RMSEs for the calibrated model. Compare the notes to Figure 4 for computation details.
Column “standard deviation-data”: measured standard deviation in the data. Column “standard deviation-
estimated”: median standard deviations in estimated model, in brackets 95% conﬁdence intervals; based on
10,000 random draws from the posterior parameter distribution. Standard deviations are computed by, for
each draw, simulating time-series of the same length as in the data used to compute the standard deviations
(an initial 200 observations are discarded so as to draw out of the stochastic steady state). The bounds reﬂect
data and parameter uncertainty. Column “standard deviation-calibrated”: median standard deviations and
95% bounds in the calibrated model of Section 3; based on 10,000 draws of time-series of the same length as in
the data, keeping parameters ﬁxed at the calibrated values. The calibration focused on matching unconditional
moments in the model to second moments in the data; this is reported in Table 4. Here we take the sampling
uncertainty of shocks into account, too.
interest rates and unemployment. In terms of RMSE it is signiﬁcantly worse than the VAR,
though, for hours worked and wages per employee, while it provides a better ﬁt for inﬂation than
the VAR. A comparison of the RMSEs for the estimated model and the RMSEs for the calibrated
model (cp. third and fourth columns) shows that for most variables, the estimation improves
upon the (in sample) ﬁt of the model. The second set of results displayed in Table 10 concerns
standard deviations in the model and in the data. Once we have accounted for both parameter
and data uncertainty, the estimated model captures the standard deviations of output, interest
rates, vacancies and unemployment at the 5% level, but implies too volatile series for hours
worked and wages per employee. For completeness, accounting for data uncertainty, we also
report the standard deviations implied by the calibrated version of the model used in Section 3.
54Figure 5: Responses to a monetary shock – calibrated vs. estimated baseline
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Notes: The panels show percentage responses (1 in the plots corresponds to 1%) to a
1
4% monetary policy
shock for varying degrees of wage rigidity. The black solid line marks the responses in the calibrated model.
The red dotted lines bracket 95% conﬁdence intervals. These were obtained using 10,000 draws from the
posterior distribution of the estimated parameters, baseline version.
For comparing the implications of the calibrated and the estimated version of the model, Figure
5 shows the impulse responses to a monetary shock in the calibrated economy, overlayed by 95%
coverage intervals for the impulse responses implied by the estimated version of the model.
Table 11 reports the full forecast error decompositions at three horizons for the baseline estima-
tion. This complements the information in Table 7, which limited itself to a subset of variables,
shocks and horizons.
55Table 11: Forecast error variance decomposition estimated model – baseline version
labor market shocks
bargain vacancy separation premium cost-push monetary governm. technol.
Horizon 2
  yt 8.0 .3 .1 60.5 6.9 14.8 2.6 4.9
  Rt 5.4 .02 .02 32.2 2.5 56.5 .8 .6
  Π
yoy
t 12.0 .3 .6 24.8 35.0 6.5 .2 18.2
  ht+  nt 6.3 .08 .2 47.9 5.3 11.7 2.1 24.8
  ut .8 16.5 64.3 11.0 2.8 2.8 .2 .2
  vt 3.5 46.5 6.2 26.2 7.0 6.9 .4 1.7
  wt+  ht 1.9 .5 3.1 47.2 17.5 11.5 1.8 15.0
  ht 5.9 .6 3.5 44.6 4.5 10.9 2.0 26.1
  wt 67.4 .1 .04 .6 22.2 .2 .02 8.3
Horizon 10
  yt 16.7 1.7 .6 48.2 6.3 12.1 2.0 9.2
  Rt 11.3 .6 .4 46.5 4.7 28.1 .5 5.6
  Π
yoy
t 11.9 1.2 .7 39.5 18.0 11.1 .2 13.9
  ht+  nt 14.7 .1 .2 45.1 5.5 11.2 1.9 19.1
  ut 6.0 43.4 24.2 12.3 3.2 3.4 .2 2.8
  vt 5.4 47.3 6.7 22.4 6.1 5.8 .4 2.8
  wt+  ht 2.8 3.0 3.4 45.8 16.9 11.3 1.6 13.4
  ht 11.0 4.6 4.0 40.3 4.3 9.9 1.8 21.6
  wt 59.5 .8 .1 2.6 19.3 .7 .03 14.6
Horizon ∞
  yt 16.8 2.0 .6 47.9 6.3 12.0 2.0 9.1
  Rt 11.2 .8 .4 47.7 4.6 27.1 0.5 5.4
  Π
yoy
t 12.1 1.2 .7 39.4 17.8 11.1 0.2 14.0
  ht+  nt 14.7 .2 .2 45.0 5.5 11.2 1.9 19.1
  ut 6.1 45.1 23.0 11.8 3.1 3.2 0.2 2.6
  vt 5.4 47.4 6.7 22.4 6.0 5.8 0.4 2.8
  wt+  ht 2.8 3.2 3.4 45.7 16.9 11.3 1.6 13.4
  ht 11.0 5.0 4.0 40.1 4.3 9.9 1.8 21.5
  wt 59.3 1.0 0.1 2.6 19.2 0.6 0.03 14.7
Notes: Forecast error variance decomposition for three diﬀerent forecast horizons using the
baseline parameter estimates. All entries are in %. Shown are median values for each
entry, so entries do not need to sum to exactly 100%. Entries are based on 10,000 draws
from the posterior distribution. From top to bottom: output, nominal interest rate, annual
inﬂation, total hours worked, unemployment, vacancies, wage per employee, hours worked
per employee and the real wage rate. From left to right: bargaining power shock, vacancy
posting cost shock, separation rate shock, risk premium shock, cost-push shock, monetary
policy shock, government spending shock and technology shock.
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